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An Exclusive License Is Not an Assignment: 
Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of 
Ownership in Copyright 
Christopher M. Newman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem 
Is an exclusive license the same thing as an assignment? For 
most of the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, to seriously 
pose such a question would have been simply to confess one’s 
ignorance of the meanings of the terms. An assignment is a 
conveyance of one’s entire ownership interest in some property to 
someone else.1 The assignee becomes the new owner while the 
assignor becomes an ex-owner. A license, on the other hand, is 
merely a permission.2 It creates a limited-use privilege in the 
licensee and therefore necessarily curtails to that extent the owner’s 
right to exclude. It leaves all other residual powers of ownership, 
however, firmly in the licensor’s sole possession. 
In the realm of copyright, this clear distinction has been 
muddied—many claim obliterated—by the Copyright Act of 1976, 
which included the term “exclusive license” within the statutorily 
defined term “transfer of copyright ownership.”3 In Gardner v. Nike, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while this 
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 1. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990) (defining assignment 
as “a transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or 
personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein”). 
 2. See, e.g., Clifford v. O’Neill, 42 N.Y.S. 607, 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896). 
It may be conceded that a license is merely a permission to do an act 
which, without such permission, would amount to a trespass; and that 
such permission, when related to real estate, is not equivalent to an 
easement; nor will the continuous enjoyment of the privilege conferred, 
for any period of time, cause it to ripen into a tangible interest in the land 
affected. 
Id.  
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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provision, in conjunction with others, confers on exclusive copyright 
licensees the “protection and remedies” accorded to “copyright 
owners” by the 1976 Act—including the right to sue for 
infringement—it does not entirely obliterate the distinction between 
licenses and assignments.4 In particular, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the statute did not abrogate the preexisting presumption that 
copyright licenses are not transferable without the consent of the 
licensor.5 
Scholarly commentary on Gardner (including that of the two 
leading copyright treatises) has been uniformly and vociferously 
critical,6 and on one recent occasion, a bill that would have 
overruled the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute was introduced 
in Congress, though the relevant provision was not enacted.7 
Gardner’s critics assert—with no little vehemence—that the holding 
blatantly contradicts the statutory text and legislative history and 
that it runs counter to the policy of copyright divisibility adopted in 
the 1976 Act.8 According to these critics, by saying that an 
exclusive license is a “transfer of copyright ownership,” the statute 
necessarily gives exclusive licensees full powers of title with respect 
                                                                                                             
 4. Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
10.02[B][4][b] (criticizing Gardner and suggesting that it “should not be 
followed”); WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:103 (Westlaw 2013) 
(calling it “one of the most baffling copyright opinions ever . . . . [D]ecision 
making run amok”); Alice Haemmerli, Why Doctrine Matters: Patent and 
Copyright Licensing and the Meaning of Ownership in Federal Context, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 14–19 (2006) (severely criticizing the opinion’s reasoning 
and result); Peter H. Kang & Jia Ann Yang, Case Note, Doctrine of Indivisibility 
Revived?, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 365, 371–73 (2002) 
(criticizing the court’s statutory interpretation of § 201(d)(4)); Aaron Xavier 
Fellmeth, Control Without Interest: State Law of Assignment, Federal Preemption, 
and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 20–27 (2001) 
(criticizing the district court decision). 
 7. See S. 3689, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2010), enacted as Pub. L. No. 111-295, 
124 Stat. 3180 (2010). The bill would have added to the end of § 201(d)(2) the 
phrase “including the right to transfer or license the exclusive right to another 
person in the absence of a written agreement to the contrary.’’ Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 8. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103. 
Gardner is Exhibit A in why courts shouldn’t be making policy: the 
principle of divisibility was thrashed out by the Congress, the Copyright 
Office, copyright experts, and the copyright industries over 16 years; yet, 
all that work was jeopardized by judges who do not possess the expertise, 
who did not participate in the policy choices, who did not draft the 
statutory language, and who refuse to apply the statute. 
Id. 
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to the licensed rights, including unfettered powers of subdivision 
and transfer.9 
This Article takes the position that Gardner’s critics are 
mistaken and that there is a strong case that the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision was both correct as a matter of statutory interpretation and 
consistent with the legislative history. More fundamentally, this 
Article argues that Gardner’s critics are making a number of 
mistaken assumptions in their thinking about ownership and 
divisibility, assumptions that underlie and explain their erroneous 
reading of the statute. Properly understood, the policy of divisible 
copyright is perfectly compatible with the view that exclusive 
licenses are nontransferable ownership interests. 
Divisibility permits a copyright owner to split off some subset of 
exclusive rights to the work and assign it separately, thus 
relinquishing all authority over it and effectively creating an entirely 
separate object of ownership. By choosing instead to grant an 
exclusive license, the copyright owner signals the intent to retain 
ultimate residual authority over the use rights granted. The exclusive 
license interests enabled by the 1976 Act constitute a form of 
ownership in that they vest exclusive licensees with certain 
enumerated independent powers of title that had been denied them 
under previous law. Such licenses still fall short of plenary title, 
however, in that the licensing owner retains the authority to control 
the use of her work by controlling the identity of the licensee. 
Permitting this type of arrangement is potentially beneficial as a 
matter of copyright policy because on the margins it should tend to 
reduce fragmentation of title and enhance authorial control. 
B. The Sources of the Legal Dispute 
1. The Statutory Language 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides in 17 U.S.C. § 101 that: 
A ‘‘transfer of copyright ownership’’ is an assignment, 
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, 
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the 
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it 
is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a 
nonexclusive license.10 
On its face, this definition does not purport to alter the meanings 
of any of the terms subsumed under the one being defined. What it 
                                                                                                             
 9. See infra note 39. 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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does is group together a number of transactions and give them a 
collective label in order to ascribe certain attributes to them as a 
group elsewhere in the statute. The term defined here—“transfer of 
copyright ownership”—appears a total of four other times in the 
Copyright Act: 
• § 204(a) (providing that such a transaction is not valid 
unless in a writing signed by the grantor). • § 205(a) (providing for recordation of such transactions). • § 205(e) (providing that rights granted by such 
transactions may be trumped by a prior nonexclusive 
license that was granted in a writing signed by the 
licensor). • § 708 (providing for payment of fees to the Register of 
Copyright when such transactions are recorded). 
Nothing about these provisions suggests that the use of the word 
“ownership” in the statutory label need be read as changing the 
substantive nature of an exclusive license. So far as these provisions 
are concerned, one could read the phrase “transfer of copyright 
ownership” as simply a placeholder, one that might be replaced by 
some other phrase, such as “formal copyright transaction,” without 
changing anything material. Indeed, one might expect that if the 
drafters had intended to obliterate so fundamental a distinction as 
that between a license and an assignment, they would have 
addressed this more directly than by simply lumping the two 
together in a statutory term of art. 
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that the inclusion of 
exclusive licenses within the category “transfer of copyright 
ownership” was intended to result in some alteration of their 
substantive nature. There is no dispute, for example, that the drafters 
of the statute intended to confer on exclusive licensees the 
independent entitlement to bring suit for infringement,11 and the 
only provisions that can be read as granting this entitlement do so 
only on the assumption that an exclusive licensee is now an “owner” 
of the exclusive rights licensed to him. Thus, § 201(d)(2) provides: 
                                                                                                             
 11. See H.R. No. 94-1476 (commenting on § 201(d)(2)). “It is thus clear, for 
example, that a local broadcasting station holding an exclusive license to transmit 
a particular work within, holding a particular geographic area and for a particular 
period of time, could sue, in its own name as copyright owner, someone who 
infringed that particular exclusive right.” Id. 
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The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the 
extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies 
accorded to the copyright owner by this title.12 
Section 501(b), in turn, provides: 
The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a 
copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or 
she is the owner of it.13 
Additionally, the “owner” of an exclusive right is empowered “to do 
and to authorize” any of the activities encompassed by that right14 
and to obtain registration of any work of authorship created within 
its ambit.15 In these respects at least, it seems clear that the statute 
was intended to confer a substantive status of “owner” on exclusive 
licensees. 
The question remains, however, whether the “ownership” 
enjoyed by an exclusive licensee is in all respects identical to that 
enjoyed by an assignee. The term “ownership” is not itself defined 
in the statute,16 and while it has a core meaning in broader usage, the 
precise set of legal entitlements associated with it can vary greatly 
depending on context. The most salient practical question is whether 
an exclusive copyright licensee now has power to transfer the 
license or grant sublicenses under it, and the statute does not 
expressly address this.17 
2. The Holding of Gardner v. Nike 
In Gardner v. Nike, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the 1976 Act did not abrogate the preexisting 
presumption of nonassignability for exclusive copyright licenses.18 
The case involved the rights to a cartoon character named “MC 
Teach,” of which Nike was the author. Nike had granted an 
                                                                                                             
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006). 
 13. Id. § 501(b). 
 14. Id. § 106. 
 15. See id. § 408(a) (“The owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the 
work may obtain registration of the copyright claim.”). 
 16. Section 101 only states that one may be an owner of “any one of the 
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,” id. § 101, and that such ownership may 
be transferred by any means of conveyance or by operation of law. Id. § 201(a)(1). 
 17. Section 201 states that copyright ownership “may be transferred” but not 
who is empowered to transfer it. See discussion infra Part IV.B. As for the premise 
that such transferability is necessarily included in the term “ownership,” this 
Article contends that it is mistaken. See infra Part II.E. 
 18. Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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exclusive license to Sony in an agreement that was silent as to 
Sony’s ability to assign its rights under the license.19 Sony assigned 
all of its rights to Gardner, who then brought a declaratory action to 
establish the validity of the assignment in response to threats of legal 
action from Nike.20 
In affirming the district court’s holding in favor of Nike, the 
Ninth Circuit relied in part on its earlier decision in Harris v. Emus 
Records Corp.21 Harris had held that copyright licenses issued 
under the 1909 Copyright Act were “not transferable as a matter of 
law.”22 The holding rested on two grounds. First was the traditional 
distinction, enshrined in both copyright and patent law (not to 
mention property doctrine more generally), between an assignment 
and a license.23 In the context of patent and copyright, this 
distinction had come to be closely associated with the “doctrine of 
indivisibility,” which permitted assignment of the copyright or 
patent estate only as an indivisible whole, such that any attempt to 
transfer ownership of less than the totality of all exclusive rights 
would result in a mere license.24 This had two primary practical 
consequences. 
First, as stated above, a license was traditionally understood as a 
mere permission, giving the licensee use privileges but not 
ownership.25 Even if the license was “exclusive,” this traditionally 
meant only that the licensor had assumed a contractual obligation 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id. at 776.  For a more complete statement of the facts, see Fellmeth, 
supra note 6, at 7–10. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 22. Id. at 1333. 
 23. See id. (“It has been held that a copyright licensee is a ‘bare licensee . . . 
without any right to assign its privilege.’” (quoting Ilyin v. Avon Publ’ns, Inc., 
144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956))); Id. (“A patent license has been 
characterized as ‘a naked license to make and sell the patented improvement as a 
part of its business, which right, if it existed, was a mere personal one, and not 
transferable . . . .’” (quoting Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886))). 
 24. See ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN, STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
86TH CONG., DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHTS 12 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter 
KAMINSTEIN] (“If the grant is an assignment, the assignee has full rights; if it is a 
license, then the doctrine of indivisibility may be used to bar the licensee from 
doing some of the things an assignee could do.”). Note that Kaminstein’s 
description exhibits the very confusion this Article seeks to rectify. It is not the 
“doctrine of indivisibility” that bars licensees from doing some of the things that 
an assignee can do; those relative disabilities result from the differing natures of 
assignments and licenses and exist even in contexts (such as land law) where there 
is no “doctrine of indivisibility.” What the doctrine of indivisibility does is to 
prohibit the grant of partial rights by means of assignment, thus leaving licenses 
(with their attendant disabilities) as the only form available for certain types of 
transactions. 
 25. See supra note 2. 
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not to interfere in the licensed use, whether directly or by giving 
conflicting permissions to others.26 The exclusivity enjoyed by an 
exclusive licensee thus did not take the form of in rem rights directly 
and independently enforceable against third parties.27 The duty of 
such parties to refrain from interference with the property was not 
owed to the exclusive licensee and could not be invoked by him.28 
Rather, it was owed to the copyright owner, who might or might not 
be contractually obliged to enforce it on behalf of the licensee.29 
Second, a license was generally regarded as a form of in personam 
relationship that the licensee was not able to transfer to others 
without the licensor’s permission.30 
The court in Harris had also, however, invoked “the policies 
underlying enactment of the Copyright Act,” which required it to 
“delicately balance” between “strong reluctance to allow a 
monopolization of works or compositions” and “the necessity of 
preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate 
creativity.”31 The court thought that these policies favored 
maintaining the distinction between assignments and licenses: “By 
licensing rather than assigning his interest in the copyright, the 
owner reserves certain rights, including that of collecting royalties. 
His ability to monitor use would be jeopardized by allowing 
sublicensing without notice.”32 
The court also looked for guidance to federal precedent in the 
patent arena, where a longstanding line of cases has held licenses to 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Ridsdale Ellis, Validity of Doctrine That a Full Exclusive License Is 
in Fact an Assignment, 36 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 643, 644 (1954) 
(“An exclusive license is merely an undertaking by the owner of the patent that he 
will not grant licenses to any other party and usually also that he will not himself 
compete with the exclusive licensee by making, using and vending the 
invention.”). 
 27. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001) (stating that in rem rights are 
those that bind “the rest of the world”). 
 28. See, e.g., ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW WITH ESPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE PRESENT UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ACT 546 (1917) 
(“[U]nless coupled with a grant, [an exclusive license] conferred, no more than did 
any other license, no interest or property in the subject matter of the contract, and, 
hence, it was held a licensee could not sue, in his own name, for infringement.”). 
As will be discussed later, exclusive licensees were usually able to bring suit 
despite this. See infra Part V.A. 
 29. WEIL, supra note 28, at 546. 
 30. See id. at 549 (“A license is usually deemed personal, and hence not 
transferrable, while, since all the assignor’s rights are divested on assignment, an 
assignee may, of course, reassign. A licensee may not grant sublicenses unless 
authorized to do so by the licensor.”). 
 31. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 32. Id. 
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be personal and nontransferable as a matter of federal common law 
rooted in federal intellectual property policy.33 This is a striking 
stance for the federal courts to take when Congress has not spoken 
to the issue.34 The rules governing property transfer and contract are 
generally regarded as matters of state law in which federal courts 
have no inherent common law making ability, yet federal courts 
have held their rule of license nontransferability to trump conflicting 
state law in patent and copyright cases.35 
In Gardner, the court reaffirmed its statements from Harris and 
then proceeded to ask whether the provisions of the 1976 Act need be 
read to override the established rule of license nontransferability.36 
The court answered in the negative, reasoning that while the statute 
confers a form of “ownership” on exclusive licensees and § 201(d)(2) 
extends to such owners all the “protection and remedies accorded to 
the copyright owner by this title,” the power of transfer does not fall 
within the category of “protection and remedies” so accorded.37 The 
Ninth Circuit thus read the statute as using the term “ownership” to 
refer to an interest that did not include all the powers generally 
associated with title. The result—in the Ninth Circuit at least38—is 
that unless an exclusive copyright license contains terms giving the 
licensee the power to transfer or sublicense, the licensee is unable to 
do so without the licensor’s permission. 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. at 1333–34 (citing Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886); 
Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley, Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 929 (1973). See also Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 
435–37 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that where state law would allow for the transfer of 
a copyright license absent express authorization, state law must yield to the federal 
common law rule prohibiting such unauthorized transfers). 
 34. See Fellmeth, supra note 6 (arguing that this doctrine oversteps the proper 
bounds of federal judicial authority). 
 35. See id.  For an argument that federal courts have legitimate lawmaking 
power in this area, see Christopher M. Newman, What Exactly Are You Implying?: 
The Elusive Nature of the Implied Copyright License, 32 CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
 36. See Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 777–80 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 37. Id. at 780. 
 38. While the reasoning of Gardner has been rejected by one other federal 
court, see Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 872 (S.D. Ind. 2006), 
the issue does not appear to have been squarely presented in other published 
opinions. 
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C. A Preliminary Overview of the Argument 
1. The Relevance of Property Theory 
What is striking about the criticism of Gardner is that it derives 
most of its rhetorical force from assertions that are grounded, if 
anywhere, in property doctrine and theory—and yet no one 
advancing these assertions makes any effort to show that such 
grounding actually exists. There are two assertions: 1) that the term 
“ownership” necessarily implies unfettered powers of transfer and 2) 
that the policy of divisible title requires eliminating the distinction 
between exclusive license and assignment. 
a. The Meaning of “Ownership” 
Given the vehemence with which Gardner’s critics press their 
claim that the Ninth Circuit butchered the statutory text, one would 
expect them to provide support for their premise that use of the term 
“ownership” always and everywhere implies rights of transfer.39 
Instead, they take it as given, too self-evident to need citation or 
even second thought.40 
There are several reasons for greater caution in this regard. First, 
as concepts go, the term “ownership” is a fairly broad and fuzzy-
edged one, and the precise implications of being an “owner” can 
vary depending on the situation and the nature of the object of 
                                                                                                             
 39. Indeed, one of these critics, Alice Haemmerli, subtitled her article on this 
issue “Why Doctrine Matters” yet omitted discussion of any property doctrine that 
would justify her emphatic equation of “ownership,” “title,” and transferability. 
See Haemmerli, supra note 6. 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 7–8. 
An exclusive license of copyright is defined by the Copyright Act as a 
“transfer of copyright ownership.” Despite this robust and unambiguous 
phrasing (and forceful legislative history to back it up), however, the 
Ninth Circuit decided in [Gardner] that an exclusive copyright licensee is 
less than an owner, reducing its status to that of a beneficial owner rather 
than a transferee of legal ownership. 
Id. See also id. at 15 (“If ownership ‘changes hands,’ then the new owner 
should be endowed with plenary rights to the extent of its ownership, 
including the ‘right to transfer.’”); PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103 (“Congress 
addressed the question of an exclusive licensee’s right to transfer rights 
without the author’s permission both in Section 201(d)(1) and in Section 101. 
Section 101 defines a ‘copyright owner as the owner of any particular 
exclusive right.’”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][a] (“The 
[exclusive licensee] having acquired ‘title’ or ownership of the rights 
conveyed, may reconvey them absent contractual restrictions.”). Note that 
Nimmer places “title” but not “ownership” in quotation marks, even though it 
is the latter and not the former term that appears in the statute. 
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ownership.41 If we are speaking of “a present fee simple in land, or 
of a corresponding absolute interest in chattels”—that is, of plenary 
title to a tangible resource—then the power of alienation is indeed “a 
characteristic attribute of ownership.”42 When we are speaking of 
the ownership of certain elements of title to a resource that have 
been detached from others, however, the question of alienability 
becomes more complex. A fairly obvious and highly relevant 
example in the real property context of such an ownership interest is 
the easement. There is no question that an easement is a form of 
“ownership” interest in land,43 but owning an easement is obviously 
not the same thing as owning title to the land; nor are easements 
necessarily transferable at will. 
I suggest that the reason we refer to an easement, despite its 
limitations, as a form of “ownership” interest is that an easement 
gives its holder authority to engage in certain protected uses of the 
land that no one else has discretionary power to countermand or 
revoke. I will argue that this account of the meaning of “ownership” 
makes perfect sense when applied to exclusive copyright licenses 
under the 1976 Act, as well as to the other types of interest referred 
to in the statutory definition of “transfer of ownership.” The reader 
need not accept this account of “ownership” as providing the best or 
only definition of the concept in order to accept this argument, 
however. It is sufficient to agree that this account is plausible and 
reconcilable with both traditional usage and the terms of the statute. 
If so, then it successfully rebuts the (unsubstantiated) assertion of 
Gardner’s critics that the opinion is wrong simply because it makes 
nonsense of the term “ownership.” 
                                                                                                             
 41. See DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Unfortunately, ownership is an imprecise concept, and the 
Copyright Act does not define the term.”). The layers of meaning are well 
reflected in the entry “owner” in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 1, at 1105. 
The entry first describes an “owner” as one who has “dominion of a thing . . . 
which he has a right to enjoy and do with as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, 
as far as the law permits . . . .” Id. The entry then immediately qualifies this, 
however, stating: 
The term is, however, a nomen generalissimum, and its meaning is to be 
gathered from the connection in which it is used, and from the subject-
matter to which it is applied. The primary meaning of the word as applied 
to land is one who owns the fee and who has the right to dispose of the 
property, but the term also includes one having a possessory right to land 
or the person occupying or cultivating it.  
Id. 
 42. Merrill I. Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property, in VI 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.1 (1952). 
 43. See infra note 96. 
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b. The Meaning and Function of Divisibility 
Everyone agrees that the 1976 Act abandoned the so-called 
“doctrine of indivisibility.”44 This doctrine, murky in origin,45 
required that title to copyright remain unitary and refused (in theory 
at least) to recognize any possibility of different ownership interests 
in the same work of authorship being vested in different persons.46 
This doctrine is abrogated by § 201(d)(2) of the Act, which 
provides: 
                                                                                                             
 44. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02. 
 45. Arthur Weil notes in his 1917 treatise on copyright law that “[v]arious 
dicta, in the books, deem a copyright an entirety, indivisible and hence not capable 
of partial assignment” but regards it as “quite obvious” that this does not prevent 
separate assignments of the various rights granted by the statute. WEIL, supra note 
28, at 547–48 (raising, but not pursuing, the question whether the nature of such 
transactions is more like a license than an assignment). The Second Circuit held in 
1915 that the exclusive motion picture right newly added in the Townsend 
Amendment of 1912 was separately assignable, Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. 
v. Soc. Uplift Film Corp., 220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915), but in 1922 it reached back to 
dicta from its 1908 decision in the famous Bobbs-Merrill case to support the 
position that “[n]owhere in the statute is there to be found any right conferred 
upon a licensee or upon an assignee less than the owner of the copyright.” 
Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1922) (citing 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1908)), for the proposition that 
“[t]he copyright statute provides only for the assignment of a right as a whole . . . .”). 
This view apparently rested on the various references in the 1909 Act to “the 
copyright proprietor,” which were regarded as necessarily implying unitary 
ownership. See Harry G. Henn, Magazine Rights—A Division of Indivisible 
Copyright, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 411, 416 (1955); see also KAMINSTEIN, supra note 
24, at 2 (tracing the origin of the doctrine back to the Supreme Court’s patent 
decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891), and an early English 
copyright case, Jefferys v. Boosey, (1854) 4 H.L. 681. 
 46. See Henn, supra note 45, at 417–18. 
With respect to a particular work embodied in concrete form, or 
separable part of such work, there is, at any one time, in any particular 
jurisdiction, only a single incorporeal legal title or property known as the 
copyright, which encompasses all of the authorial rights recognized by 
the law of the particular jurisdiction with respect thereto. 
Id. To be clear, the doctrine of indivisibility did not rule out the possibility of co-
ownership. It required that all control rights remain united in a single title but 
permitted ownership of this unitary title to be shared concurrently by multiple co-
owners, each of whom had an “undivided interest in the entire work” and could 
exploit the work without permission from the others in a manner akin to tenants in 
common. See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 645–47 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (discussing doctrine). While this arrangement involved multiple 
owners, it did not diminish the indivisibility of the copyright “estate” itself. There 
was, however, an exception to indivisibility of the estate: it was permissible in 
some contexts to create different exclusive geographic territories and to assign 
one’s rights in each territory to a different party. See KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, 
at 11–12. 
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Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, 
including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by 
section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) 
and owned separately.47 
Thus, for example, it is now possible for an author to take the film 
rights to a novel and make them the subject of an assignment to 
some other party. This will result in creation of an entirely separate 
copyright estate in the film rights, effectively sundering all control 
of those rights from control of all the other exclusive rights in the 
novel.  
Gardner’s critics insist that the opinion flouts this principle of 
divisibility,48 even though nothing in Gardner casts doubt on the 
possibility of making an assignment like the one just described. 
Rather, Gardner held that such plenary assignment is not the only 
possible ownership interest a copyright owner is empowered to 
create in the now-divisible rights comprised within the copyright. 
Gardner recognized copyright owners as having the ability to 
choose between two different ways of conferring (some or all) use 
rights on others.49 They can do so by assignment, thus relinquishing 
all ownership of the rights assigned, or they can do so by exclusive 
license, thus retaining the status of residual titleholder with respect 
to those rights, along with power to control whether they shall be 
placed in hands other than those of the selected licensee. While 
exclusive licensees therefore lack the plenary power acquired by 
assignees, their position is nevertheless significantly stronger than it 
had been prior to the 1976 Act. One of the goals of that Act 
(separate from that of abolishing indivisibility) was to make the 
status of exclusive licensee more attractive by removing what had 
always been its primary disadvantage—the inability of a licensee to 
enforce his exclusive rights without involvement of the copyright 
owner.50  
The statute thus altered the prior landscape in two related but 
distinct ways: 1) it permitted the creation of separate ownership 
interests in different subsets of the exclusive rights to a single work 
and 2) it created a new form of ownership interest, namely an 
                                                                                                             
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006). 
 48. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14 (asserting that copyright indivisibility 
“re-emerged fully hatched in Gardner”); PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103. 
 49. “Use right” means a legal interest consisting of two Hohfeldian jural 
relations: a privilege to engage in some designated use, coupled with a claim right 
of non-interference in that use enforceable against others. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 33–44 (1919). A nonexclusive license confers only a use privilege 
unaccompanied by any right. 
 50. See infra Part III.A. 
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exclusive license that confers independent standing to sue. Each of 
these changes altered prior background understandings concerning 
both the meaning of ownership and the interface between property 
and contract. Much of the confusion and controversy surrounding 
the issue decided in Gardner stems from the lack of a clear 
conceptual model of this new landscape. A main purpose of this 
Article is to articulate such a model, in the belief that doing so both 
explains why Gardner makes sense (i.e., fits into a coherent 
conceptual framework continuous with the rest of property doctrine) 
and suggests why its practical consequences may be beneficial. 
Part II develops the points concerning ownership and divisibility 
mentioned above, explaining that the function and doctrinal 
attributes of an easement over land are closely (though not perfectly) 
analogous to those of an exclusive copyright license. Each type of 
interest serves to enhance people’s ability to make joint or 
interdependent use of resources by giving investors property-based, 
rather than merely contract-based, protection against the risk of 
holdup incurred when creating specific assets. Each type of interest 
gives its owner irrevocable privileges to make certain uses of 
property whose residual title remains in someone else. The 
nontransferability of the interest, in turn, gives the grantor protection 
against changes in the quality of use that would be difficult to 
capture in express terms enforceable against third parties. 
Part III applies these ideas more specifically to the context of 
copyright. I suggest that given the nature of the relationship between 
an author and his or her work, copyright licenses present problems 
similar to those raised by personal easements in gross. It is desirable 
for authors to be able to grant property-based protection to entities 
like publishers who will need to invest in the creation of specific 
assets, while at the same time retaining residual ownership over 
those rights, exercised via control over the identity of the licensee. 
Requiring licensees to affirmatively seek rights of transfer from 
authors should serve both to enhance the extent to which copyright 
serves the interests of authors and to reduce the unproductive 
fragmentation of rights. 
2. The Question of Statutory Interpretation 
While the issue decided in Gardner is one of statutory 
interpretation, the controversy around it is not primarily rooted in 
conflicting views as to the proper interpretive methodology. 
Gardner’s critics do not contend that the Ninth Circuit applied an 
erroneous theory of interpretation so much as they claim that it did a 
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shoddy job of interpreting.51 Likewise, this Article does not contend 
that Gardner’s critics are misidentifying the relevant sources from 
which to discern statutory meaning; it simply contends that their 
understanding of those sources is flawed. Both sides in this debate 
are making use of various arguments that can be categorized as 
textualist, purposivist, and intentionalist, and both sides believe their 
conclusions to be buttressed by all three. Accordingly, I have little 
stake in taking a position as to the relative merits of different 
possible interpretive stances and will not offer an argument that one 
is superior to another. In order to make clear exactly how the 
questions of property theory bear on the ultimate question of 
statutory meaning, however, it is necessary to provide a brief 
overview explaining the nature of the disagreement from each 
interpretive perspective. 
a. The Dispute over Text 
The issue disputed in Gardner turns most directly on the 
meanings of three terms used in the 1976 Act: “ownership,” 
“exclusive license,” and “assignment.” The statute does not define 
the latter two terms at all; it merely includes them within the defined 
category “transfers of copyright ownership.”52 The Ninth Circuit 
read this category to identify a group of transactions, all of which 
are made the subject of certain enumerated consequences 
specifically prescribed elsewhere in the statute, but whose 
preexisting legal attributes remain otherwise unaltered.53 Gardner’s 
critics, on the other hand, contend that all transactions falling within 
the category “transfers of copyright ownership” must now be 
understood as plenary transfers of title, with the result that 
“exclusive licenses” and “assignments,” though listed as though 
they were still two distinct things, have actually been rendered 
legally indistinguishable from each other.54  
As explained in more detail in Part V, this latter position is 
mistaken on a textualist basis even if one were to concede that 
Gardner’s critics are correct in their understanding of the 
background meaning of “ownership.” On its face, the text of the 
statute does not purport to use the term “transfer of copyright 
ownership” as a vehicle to import such background meaning but 
                                                                                                             
 51. See supra note 8. 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 53. See Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 54. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17 (contending that Gardner 
“subverts” the goal of the statute by “deciding that the entitlements of an exclusive 
licensee of copyright consist of . . . less than the full panoply of ownership rights, 
including the ability to transfer at will”). 
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rather expressly designates it as a term of art whose meaning is 
limited to the specific things ascribed to it elsewhere in the statute.55 
Those things alter the nature of an exclusive license but nowhere do 
they prescribe that exclusive licenses shall be freely transferable by 
licensees. The assertion that the statute does so prescribe is not 
(though it is claimed to be) based on its actual text but on an 
unwarranted inference from use of the term “ownership,” rooted in a 
mistaken belief that this reading is necessary to effectuate the 
statute’s intended purpose. 
From a purely textualist perspective then, the textual analysis 
provided in Part V stands on its own even without the discussion of 
property theory in Parts III and IV. That discussion nevertheless 
buttresses the textual argument by helping to explain why it would 
make sense for the drafters of the statute to make the choices they 
did. 
b. The Dispute over Purpose 
At one level, there is no dispute as to the purpose of the relevant 
provisions of the 1976 Act. Everyone agrees that the statute serves 
to abrogate the doctrine of indivisibility.56 The disagreement 
concerns exactly what this requires and what follows from it. In 
asserting that Gardner crucially undermines the policy of divisible 
copyright, its critics must have one of two things in mind. The first 
is a matter of simple semantic confusion, while the latter goes to 
questions concerning the desired structure of property rights. 
The semantic question concerns the meaning of the term 
“license.” Some criticism of Gardner appears to be based on the 
premise that any transfer concerning some, but not all, of the 
exclusive rights under the copyright is by definition a “license.”57 
                                                                                                             
 55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, as used 
in this title, the following terms and their variant forms mean the following[.]” 
(emphasis added)). The terms “exclusive license” and “assignment,” by contrast, 
are not defined in the statute and are left to be interpreted in accordance with the 
background principles of property conveyance that the statute expressly 
incorporates. See id. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be 
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law 
. . . .”). 
 56. See Gardner, 279 F.3d at 778 (“The 1976 Act eradicated much of the 
doctrine of indivisibility as it applied to exclusive licenses.”). 
 57. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 19 (“As for the absolute distinction 
between licenses and assignments borrowed by copyright from patent law, this 
was precisely what had made copyright law so rigid and dysfunctional under the 
1909 Act, and was one of the problems the 1976 Act revisions were intended to 
solve.”). This Article contends, rather, that it was not the distinction between 
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Assuming this premise, the holding that exclusive licenses are 
nontransferable would indeed undermine the policy of divisibility. 
The premise is mistaken, however, itself an artifact—ironically 
enough—of the very doctrine of indivisibility that Gardner’s critics 
excoriate the Ninth Circuit for (purportedly) resurrecting. Under 
indivisibility, it was true that any partial transfer58 would inevitably 
be construed as a license—but only because indivisibility prohibited 
the making of such transfers by assignment.59 By scrapping the 
doctrine of indivisibility, we remove the prohibition and permit 
partial transfers to be made by assignment. This does not mean 
taking away the already existing power to make partial transfers by 
license, so that now instead of being forced to license, would-be 
grantors of partial rights are forced to assign. That would merely 
replace one rigidity with another, thus denying authors a potentially 
valuable form of transaction through which to benefit from their 
work. The discussion in Part III attempts to clarify this matter by 
explaining the distinction between a license and a partial transfer 
and offering reasons why a policy of divisibility ought to embrace 
the possibility of an exclusive license falling short of assignment. 
To the extent that (and it is difficult to tell) Gardner’s critics are 
not simply assuming “license” to mean “partial transfer,” then their 
position must be based on the view that it is somehow undesirable—
and contrary to the goals served by divisibility—to distinguish 
between exclusive licenses and assignments. As a practical matter, 
this translates to the position that all grants of exclusive rights 
should be presumptively transferable.60 Part II argues that such a 
view is at odds with traditional property doctrine, which has been 
reluctant to accord presumptive or unfettered transferability to 
property interests that divide certain use rights to a given resource 
from others. Part III applies these ideas more specifically to the 
context of copyright, making a case that it is desirable to have a 
                                                                                                             
 
licenses and assignments that made copyright law rigid; it was the refusal to 
permit assignment of certain exclusive rights in isolation from others. 
 58. “Partial transfer” means one conferring some but not all of the use rights 
protected by the copyright. Keep in mind, too, that “use right” means a privilege to 
engage in some use, coupled with a claim right to prevent others from interfering 
in that use. See supra note 49. A nonexclusive license does not confer use rights, 
just use privileges. 
 59. See supra note 46. 
 60. It appears that Gardner’s critics would permit exclusive licenses to be 
made nontransferable by their express terms, even though this position is in 
tension with their claim that such licenses are tantamount to plenary transfers of 
ownership. See infra Part III.C. 
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category of exclusive license separate from that of assignment and 
for it to be nontransferable. 
The importance of the concept of license is that it denotes 
retention by the licensor of an ongoing residuum of control over the 
transferred rights, as opposed to an assignment, which relinquishes 
all authority.61 In the case of partial transfers, assignment results in 
the effective sundering of one resource that used to be managed as a 
whole into two distinct ones. While division of copyright in this way 
can be very useful and should therefore be permitted, it also imposes 
the costs arising from fragmentation and therefore should not be 
compelled or made the default. As a default, copyright policy should 
favor enabling authors to grant exclusive licenses while retaining 
ultimate ownership of the transferred rights. In addition to tending to 
reduce fragmentation, this rule has the advantage of enhancing 
authors’ effective control over—and ability to benefit from—the 
exploitation of their work. Again, even if one is not entirely 
persuaded that this policy is the more desirable one, it is sufficient to 
recognize it as a coherent and plausible policy, fully compatible with 
copyright divisibility and implemented by the text of the actual 
statute. 
c. The Dispute over Legislative Intent 
Critics of Gardner also invoke various expressions of intent 
found in the legislative materials leading up to enactment of the 
1976 Act, asserting that these demonstrate the Ninth Circuit’s failure 
to implement the intended effect of the statute.62 Again, this Article 
will not engage in any methodological debate as to the propriety of 
taking such materials into account, and any reader who regards them 
as categorically irrelevant may simply skip the rest of this 
Subsection and Part V in its entirety. For those who regard such 
materials as potentially relevant, Part V provides a close reading that 
shows them to be fully consistent with the textual meaning and 
purposivist account given above. This Article does not contend that 
the drafters of the materials in question (or whichever legislators 
may have read them) consciously embraced the precise purposive 
account I give in Parts II and III. In fact, the materials do not 
demonstrate that anyone thought specifically about the precise issue 
decided in Gardner. 
What the legislative materials do show is that from early on the 
ability to divide and transfer plenary ownership of particular use 
rights was thought of as an issue separate from that of conferring 
                                                                                                             
 61. See supra notes 1–2. 
 62. See infra Part V.B. 
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standing to sue on exclusive licenses. They also show that the 
nontransferability of exclusive licenses was not a salient issue and 
had nothing to do with the problems that divisibility was intended to 
address. Finally, these materials corroborate the view that the 
directive to treat exclusive licenses in the same manner as 
assignments was not an open-ended command but one with specific 
enumerated consequences in mind, most of which were expressly 
incorporated in the statute. Free transferability was never among 
them. 
II. DIVISIBILITY AND TRANSFERABILITY OF OWNERSHIP  
Critics of Gardner accuse the court of resurrecting the doctrine 
of copyright indivisibility that the 1976 Act was meant to eliminate, 
thereby contravening policies clearly stated in the legislative 
history.63 In so doing, they conflate two different issues. One is: 
May a partial transfer of rights confer plenary powers of title with 
regard to the rights transferred? The other is: Must any transfer of 
exclusive rights be presumptively construed to do so? Divisibility 
answers “yes” to the first question, but there is no reason why it 
need answer “yes” to the second as well. Ironically enough, belief 
that the answer to the second question must be “yes” is itself an 
artifact of the indivisibility doctrine, which held that the only way to 
transfer any exclusive rights was to transfer all of them, which in 
turn could only be done via plenary transfer of title. Doing away 
with indivisibility ought to provide a spectrum of potentially 
valuable forms of ownership, not all of which need to include 
plenary powers of title. Indeed, divisibility of the powers of title is 
one of the most valuable forms of divisibility. Gardner’s critics 
suffer from a blind spot that causes them to needlessly reject one of 
these forms, thus applying an obstructive indivisibility rule of their 
own making to the ownership of particular use rights made possible 
by the 1976 Act. 
In an attempt to remove the blind spot, this Article offers a 
conceptual model of the meanings and interrelations of the various 
terms at issue—“ownership,” “license,” “transfer,” “assignment,” 
and “title”—that tries to explain what divisibility seeks to achieve 
and why it is compatible with license nontransferability. Gardner’s 
critics rely heavily on an unarticulated model of this nature, one that 
is not well grounded in existing property doctrine and leads them to 
the conclusion that a useful distinction in the realm of copyright 
must be jettisoned. What follows is an attempt to articulate a better 
                                                                                                             
 63. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14 (asserting that copyright indivisibility 
“re-emerged fully hatched in Gardner”); PATRY, supra note 6. 
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set of understandings, one that has better grounding in the law and 
makes sense of the statute while preserving valuable transacting 
options and the concepts that let us make use of them. 
A. Ownership and Title 
To have “ownership” of something is to have some measure of 
decision-making authority over it that is not subject to revocation or 
countermand at the will of another. Although we describe such 
authority as “exclusive,” it is not primarily focused on the exclusion 
of others from the thing per se but on enforcing the owner’s ability 
to decide how the thing is to be used.64 When there is disagreement 
about whether a given thing may be used by person A in manner B, 
the person with ultimate discretionary power to say “yes” or “no” is 
to that extent the thing’s owner. Conversely, if someone is legally 
authorized to say to you “I can do this whether you will or nil,” you 
are to that extent not the thing’s owner. 
Most things are susceptible of lots of uses, and there is no reason 
in principle why a single owner need necessarily control all of them. 
The possibility of circumscribed concurrent spheres of ownership in 
the same object of property has become familiar in the context of 
land law, where we understand that one person can “own” a tract of 
land (and therefore have the presumptive right to control its use), 
and yet her “ownership” may be subject to another person’s 
“ownership” of an easement, which gives him certain use privileges 
and rights of noninterference that she is obliged to honor.65 In 
                                                                                                             
 64. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 
32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 631 (2009) (defining property as a “right to determine 
exclusively how a thing may be used”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in 
Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 275 (2008) (arguing that the “central 
concern” of the structure of property ownership “is not the exclusion of all non-
owners from the owned thing but, rather, the preservation of the owner’s position 
as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing”); Adam Mossoff, What Is 
Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 393 (2003) 
(“It is not exclusion that is fundamental in understanding property; the 
fountainhead of property is found in possession, i.e., the use of something, and it is 
this fact that serves as the primary element in the concept property.”); J.E. Penner, 
The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 742 (1996) 
(defining the right to property as “the right to determine the use or disposition of 
an alienable thing in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others excluding 
themselves from it”); Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 
IL POLITICO 816, 818 (1965), reprinted in ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC 
FORCES AT WORK 127, 130 (1977) (“By a system of property rights I mean a 
method of assigning to particular individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific 
goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses.”). 
 65. See generally THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 975–77 (2007). 
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theory, we could do without any concept of ownership applied to 
things, instead dividing up all the uses of which each resource is 
susceptible and making each the subject of its own independent 
entitlement.66 
Depending on the nature of the resource, however, one can 
easily see the potential for conflict under such an approach, and the 
difficulty of defining the scope of each owner’s authority so that 
they do not contradict each other and create the very sort of 
problems the institution of property seeks to solve.67 This is why in 
practice, the default is a model positing ownership of things, rather 
than ownership of individual uses.68 In most—though not all—of 
the scenarios in which property rights are important, thing-
ownership provides the best way to delineate and allocate potentially 
conflicting use rights given cognitive limits and information costs.69 
Within the model of thing-ownership, the concept of “title” has 
two primary meanings. One is that it represents “the legal link 
between a person who owns property and the property itself.”70 It 
also, however, denotes what follows from this relationship, namely 
“the union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) 
constituting the legal right to control and dispose of [the owned 
thing].”71 These elements of control are potentially innumerable in 
that they can be conceptually divided into: privileges72 to engage in 
each conceivable use of the property (a set that changes as new 
possibilities of use become known); claim-rights of noninterference 
                                                                                                             
 66. For a notable example of the suggestion to focus on use rights in lieu of 
owned “things,” see R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 34 (1959) (“[W]hether we have the right to shoot over another 
man’s land has been thought of as depending on who owns the airspace over the 
land. It would be simpler to discuss what we should be allowed to do with a 
gun.”). 
 67. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 373, 382–83 (2002) (describing the problems of coordination and 
enforcement that arise when more than one person owns rights in the same asset). 
 68. See Henry E. Smith, Property As The Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1691 (2012). For extended discussion of what is meant in this context by “thing,” 
see Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 VILL. 
L. REV. 251 (2010). 
 69. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1719 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules]; Henry E. Smith, On The 
Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012) [hereinafter 
Smith, Concepts]. 
 70. See BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 1485. 
 71. Id. 
 72. The term “privilege” is used in its Hohfeldian sense, as an absence of any 
duty to refrain from use. See Hohfeld, supra note 49, at 33–44. 
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protecting each of those uses;73 powers to grant title (or interests 
falling short of title) to others; and immunities against most 
nonconsensual deprivations of any of the above.74 The concept of 
“title” relieves us of the task of unending enumeration, leaving all 
these potentially divisible interests latent and unidentified, presumed 
to inhere in the titleholder unless specified and transferred.75 
B. Indivisibility and License 
The doctrine of indivisibility goes a step further, seeking to 
reinforce the advantages of unitary title by requiring that all control 
interests in a single object of ownership remain vested in a unitary 
title.76 Under this rule, a titleholder has power to grant use privileges 
to others but only in the form of a license. A “license” is an interest, 
granted by a titleholder, that relieves the licensee of the duty to 
refrain from some action or actions that would otherwise violate the 
titleholder’s rights of noninterference.77 A bare license, however, is 
nothing more than a privilege. Although it is a form of property 
interest,78 it is not an ownership interest because it does not create 
any obstacle to the licensor’s ability to revoke and reassign use at 
will. Indivisibility requires that there be only one owner, and so a 
                                                                                                             
 73. As I have argued elsewhere, the so-called “right to exclude” others 
physically from the property altogether is best understood as identifying a special 
subset of actions to which we apply a prophylactic bright-line rule rather than a 
case-by-case application of the broader right of non-interference. The bright-line 
rule against possessory uses of tangible resources (i.e., trespasses) is justified 
because such uses threaten categorically to interfere with an owner’s ability to 
assign use to the property at will, and the information costs of distinguishing 
between acts that do and do not have this effect outweigh the costs stemming from 
the overinclusiveness of the rule. The same underlying right of non-interference is 
applied in a more nuanced fashion to non-possessory uses that nevertheless injure 
an owner’s use and enjoyment, i.e., nuisances. See Newman, supra note 68, at 
262–67. 
 74. Note that to say these elements may be conceptually divided from each 
other for purposes of analysis is not to suggest that they should be regarded as 
primary elements whose bundling together is a matter of arbitrary preference. See 
Smith, supra note 68, at 1697 (distinguishing between using Hohfeld’s jural 
relations as an analytical device and treating their conceptual separability as a 
“theory of how our world works”). 
 75. See Smith, Concepts, supra note 69.  
 76. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 67, at 375.  
 77. See Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: 
Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 1101 (2013). 
 78. “Property interest” means any set of jural relations concerning a resource 
that renders it more valuable to the interest holder. On the propriety of departing 
from older usage to term a bare use privilege a form of “property interest,” see id. 
at 1115–18. 
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license cannot create any relationship that would contradict the 
exclusive authority of the titleholder. 
Note that nothing in this concept of license depends on the scope 
of the use privileges granted to the licensee. A license may be, and 
often is, limited to specific enumerated uses, but someone might 
well choose to license property in its entirety, granting the licensee 
permission to engage in all uses of which the property is 
susceptible.79 What separates license from assignment is not that the 
licensee has some use privileges and not others but that the 
licensee’s privileges remain subject to the licensor’s ongoing powers 
of ownership. Under the rule of indivisibility, any attempted grant of 
specific use rights was necessarily a license, but this was because 
indivisibility prohibited the splitting of ownership, not because the 
concept of license intrinsically implies such specificity. 
While the rule of indivisibility does not permit the splitting of 
ownership over an owned thing, it also does not prevent a titleholder 
from contracting to refrain from using her authority in certain ways. 
So nothing prevents the titleholder from promising to treat the 
licensee’s privileges as irrevocable and exclusive.80 The duties so 
created, however, bind only the titleholder, only in personam, and 
only to the extent of the remedies used to enforce contracts.81 They 
do not disable the titleholder’s power to revoke the license, use the 
property, or give licenses to others; they merely place her in breach 
of contract if she does so. Nor do they give the licensee any rights 
against third parties. 
This rigidly indivisible model of title has great virtues:82 It 
enables the titleholder to act as a single, readily identifiable 
clearinghouse for any and all transactions concerning use of the 
property.83 Third parties who wish to engage in such use need not 
                                                                                                             
 79. See, e.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 
(1938) (“Patent owners may grant licenses extending to all uses or limited to use 
in a defined field.”). 
 80. See Ellis, supra note 26, at 644 (“An exclusive license is merely an 
undertaking by the owner of the patent that he will not grant licenses to any other 
party and usually also that he will not himself compete with the exclusive licensee 
by making, using and vending the invention.”). 
 81. See Newman, supra note 77, at 1127–37. 
 82. See WEIL, supra note 28, at 547 (opining that the rule of copyright 
indivisibility “if properly limited, possesses great advantages of public and private 
convenience”). 
 83. See Jefferys v. Boosey, (1984) 4 H.L. 681, 750–51 (Brougham, L.). 
Nothing could be more absurd or inconvenient than that this abstract right 
should be divided, as if it were real property, into lots . . . . It is impossible 
to tell what the inconvenience would be. You might have a separate 
transfer of the right of publication in every county in the Kingdom. 
Id. 
2013] EXCLUSIVE LICENSE IS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT 81 
 
 
 
bother to identify the current actual users or the natures of their 
various uses; they need only offer to pay the titleholder for the 
needed rights. The titleholder is in a position to discover the cost of 
compensating the current licensed users (with each of whom she 
necessarily has a direct in personam relationship) for their losses if 
displaced and to include this cost (which she may have to pay them 
as damages for breach of contract) in the price quoted to the would-
be displacing user. Similarly, someone who wishes to engage in 
some activity not directed at the owned resource, but which might 
disturb the use and enjoyment of it, need only identify and transact 
with a single titleholder, whether to purchase use rights in advance 
or to resolve unforeseen conflicts once they arise.84 
C. The Purpose of Divisibility 
Despite the advantages of indivisibility, there are countervailing 
forces that tend to push property doctrine back in the direction of 
permitting titleholders to divide their title by granting ownership 
interests in individual uses. Titleholders are not always in a position 
to engage in all the highest-valued uses of their property without 
enlisting the assistance of others, who may be required to invest 
their own resources in order to bring the enterprise to fruition. These 
investments may result in the creation of specific assets whose value 
is dependent on continued use of the titleholder’s property.85 
Assuming that I, an investor, recognize this problem before 
investing, I can try to protect myself by means of a contract 
imposing a duty on you, the titleholder, not to withdraw permission 
                                                                                                             
 84. See KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 1 (“From the viewpoint of ease of 
tracing title and purposes of suit, it is much simpler to require that only the author 
or his assignee can control the copyright.”); Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 
252, 261 (1891) (emphasizing need for doctrine of indivisibility in patent law to 
avoid multiplicity of suits); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.01[A] (“The 
purpose of such indivisibility was to protect alleged infringers from the 
harassment of successive law suits. This result was achieved because only the 
copyright proprietor (which would include an assignee but not a licensee) had 
standing to bring an infringement action.”). 
 85. The concept of specific assets has been developed in the economic 
literature on industrial organization, where it is defined as “assets that have a 
significantly higher value within a particular transacting relationship than outside 
the relationship.” Benjamin Klein, Asset Specificity and Holdups 1 (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at organizationsandmarkets.files.wordpress 
.com/2009/09/klein-b-asset-specificity-and-holdups.pdf. The classic example is 
Fisher Body’s investment in the machinery required to build auto bodies for 
General Motors cars. Id. Because such machinery cannot easily be put to use 
outside the context of a supply relationship with General Motors, investing in it 
gave rise to quasi-rents and to the threat of opportunistic attempts by General 
Motors to appropriate them. See id. 
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to use the property without compensation. While this may provide 
sufficient assurance to make the investment worthwhile, contracting 
is “subject to a variety of well-known hazards and limitations”—
including the difficulties of expressly covering all possible 
contingencies and of obtaining reliable enforcement, even of those 
matters covered—that prevent it from altogether eliminating the 
possibility of opportunism.86 If possible, I would much prefer to 
obtain use rights that are irrevocable because you—and, crucially, 
anyone else to whom you transfer the property—will lack any legal 
power to revoke them, as opposed to ones that will only be 
irrevocable to the extent that I can enforce your contractual duty not 
to.87 I would also prefer to have use rights that I can enforce directly 
against third parties who may interfere in my activities, as opposed 
to merely an assurance that you will not permit such interference. In 
short, I would much rather have an ownership interest. 
Obviously, I can always obtain ownership by purchasing title to 
the resource outright. But this will not always be feasible. Often, the 
value of the use-necessary rights will form a relatively small part of 
the value of the overall resource, such that I will be unwilling or 
unable to purchase the entire resource just to obtain them. This may 
mean that I am unable to obtain sufficient protection from the risk of 
opportunism to make the contemplated investments worthwhile. 
Under a regime of strict indivisibility of title then, there will likely 
be a category of potentially welfare-increasing investments that is 
foregone because of a mismatch between the scope of the use rights 
needed and the scale of the bundle in which they are required to be 
sold. 
The purpose of dividing ownership is thus to increase the 
amount of value people can get from joint or interdependent use of 
resources.88 The goal is for titleholders to be able to grant ownership 
interests to others where property-based protection is needed to 
induce them to invest in the creation of specific assets. At the same 
time, the law must be careful to guard against excessive 
fragmentation of ownership, which has both systemic and particular 
                                                                                                             
 86. SCOTT E. MASTEN, CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 
6–10 (1996). 
 87. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 67, at 378 (identifying 
enforceability against subsequent transferees of the asset as the attribute 
distinguishing a property from a contract right). 
 88. See id. at 397 (stating that the goal is “to maximize the aggregate value of 
assets to rights holders less the aggregate user, nonuser, and system costs induced 
by the rights regime”). 
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costs.89 As we depart from the rule of indivisibility, each additional 
ownership interest we choose to recognize complicates our property 
system and increases the costs of compliance and transaction across 
the board.90 Moreover, each additional ownership interest that is 
granted in a particular resource will directly raise the cost of 
switching that resource to different uses in the future.91 
D. Divisibility and Title 
Divisibility of title permits you to sell me a specific use right in 
the form of an ownership interest. At minimum, this means that the 
interest is irrevocable and irrevocable as a matter of property law 
rather than just contract. You must be legally disabled from 
revoking, not merely subject to a contractual duty to refrain from 
doing so—Otherwise, I am not an owner.92 Thus, an easement is an 
ownership interest that includes a specified set of use privileges 
(e.g., the privilege of traversing the property within delineated 
bounds and for specified purposes), an in rem right of 
noninterference with the specified uses (enforceable against actions 
of either the grantor or third parties that obstruct passage), and an 
immunity from revocation.93 What does this development do to our 
previously tidy concept of “title” to Blackacre? Clearly, by granting 
the easement you diminish the extent of the control your ownership 
gives you over the land. The formerly limitless sea of use privileges 
your title once encompassed is now bounded by a duty not to 
interfere with my passage. I have use privileges that supersede your 
general right of noninterference and immunities that disable your 
power to revoke. In other words, I now own an interest in Blackacre 
and therefore possess certain prerogatives with regard to land use 
that you are obliged to respect. There are certain potential 
disagreements over land use with respect to which I, and not you, 
have the final say. 
Does this mean that recognition of the easement obliterates all 
the cognitive benefits afforded by the concept of “title”? Not quite. 
Even though we both own interests in Blackacre, we are still not on 
the same footing. The ownership of an easement still does not give 
                                                                                                             
 89. See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and 
Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 553–54 (2010) (discussing the 
problems raised by “copyright atomism”). 
 90. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 65. 
 91. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
 92. See Newman, supra note 77, at 1131–36. 
 93. As discussed in Part II.E, some types of easements (not all) also include a 
power of transfer. 
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me the status of a “titleholder” with respect to Blackacre.94 There is 
still only one title to the resource as such, and you have it. Even 
though one specifically enumerated use right has now been placed in 
my control, you remain the presumptive holder of all the other 
residual undifferentiated ones, and to that extent you retain your 
identity as the person exclusively entitled to assign uses to the 
resource.95 Should any new potential use of Blackacre come to light 
that is not encompassed within any specific grant of use rights given 
to someone else, it will be yours to dispose of. 
Even though I do not hold title to Blackacre, we would describe 
me as holding title to the easement.96 As before, the concept of title 
stands for the legal link between me and the object of ownership97—
which in this case is a set of use rights. Those use rights are of 
course a mere abstraction, valuable only because they give some 
measure of decisional authority over an underlying resource—the 
land. One of the consequences of dividing title is that legal 
relationships that were just part of the description of what it means 
to own something now become reified objects of ownership in their 
own right.98 As before, “title” to the easement is also a placeholder 
for whatever set of jural relations constitute the control that I have 
over the set of use rights that constitute the easement itself. At 
minimum, it consists of a privilege to exercise those use rights (i.e., 
to exercise the specified privileges to use the land and corresponding 
rights to be free from interference in doing so), coupled with an 
immunity from revocation. The next question is whether it need 
necessarily include a power of transfer as well. 
                                                                                                             
 94. See 28A C.J.S. Easements § 4 (Westlaw 2013) (“While it is not an estate 
in land, or confer title to the land, or constitute a lien thereon, an easement is 
property. While an easement is neither an estate in land nor the land itself, it is, 
however, property or an interest in land, and thus, an easement is real property.”). 
 95. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the 
U.C.C. Killed “Property”, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1318–19 (1996) (noting that 
“when property rights are divided, we customarily say one party ‘owns’ the 
property, subject to the rights of the other party” and that we tend to do so based 
on who has a right to the residual value). 
 96. See, e.g., Elrod v. Elrod, 526 S.E.2d 339, 341 (Ga. 2000); Shingleton v. 
State, 133 S.E.2d 183, 185 (N.C. 1963); Carnemella v. Sadowy, 538 N.Y.S.2d 96, 
98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); TeSelle v. Storey, 319 P.2d 218, 221 (Mont. 1957); 
Thoreau v. Pallies, 83 Mass. 425 (1861). 
 97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 98. When it comes to copyright of course, even the original object of 
ownership—the “work of authorship”—is itself a reified abstraction, and all the 
exclusive rights to its use function in practice as negative easements in gross over 
tangible resources. See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as 
Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 106–07 (2009). 
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E. Ownership and Transferability 
Critics of Gardner assume that the term “ownership” necessarily 
denotes an interest that is susceptible of unfettered transfer by the 
person who “owns” it, such that use of the phrase “transfer of 
copyright ownership” to include an exclusive license is 
contradictory if such licenses are held to be nontransferable.99 I 
suggested above that this is not so, that although the power of 
transfer is certainly one of the elements of plenary title, the essence 
of what “ownership” means is present in some degree so long as the 
“owner” possesses some degree of exclusive authority to decide 
how a resource is to be used.100 In fact, the law has taken different 
attitudes toward the transferability of different types of ownership 
interests, depending on whether title to a resource itself or 
ownership of a limited-use right is at issue. In the former case, 
restrictions on alienability are highly disfavored. In the latter, they 
are permitted and sometimes inferred. 
Property doctrine has evolved through a long history of attempts 
by titleholders to hinder or prevent their successors in title from 
transferring it to others.101 The history and resulting doctrine are too 
complex to describe fully here, but it is fair to say that property-
based restraints on alienation of title to tangible resources have 
come to be generally regarded as highly disfavored and, in many 
contexts, presumptively invalid.102 While this norm has been 
described as “under-theorized,”103 it makes sense from a perspective 
of allocative efficiency. We want resources to find their way into the 
hands of the persons best able to put them to their most highly 
valued uses. We centralize control over a resource in the hands of 
the titleholder in part to give her the incentive and ability to discover 
                                                                                                             
 99. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14–19 (severely criticizing the opinion’s 
reasoning and result). 
 100. In this respect, the bankruptcy court in In re Patient Education Media, 
Inc., 210 B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997), spoke perhaps more precisely than it 
realized in saying “[o]wnership is the sine qua non of the right to transfer . . . .”  
Id. at 240.  That is to say, ownership is a necessary condition of right to transfer.  
The converse, of course, does not follow. 
 101. See Schnebly, supra note 42, § 26.1; see also, Michael D. Kirby, 
Restraints on Alienation: Putting a 13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century 
Perspective, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 413 (1988); Richard E. Manning, The 
Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373 
(1935); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 2–
3, 9–10 (2d ed. 1895). 
 102. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 65, at 532–36, 607–12. 
 103. Van Houweling, supra note 89, at 903. See also Schnebly, supra note 42, 
§ 26.3 (limiting treatise discussion of “The Social and Economic Objections to 
Restraints” to four fairly general paragraphs). 
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what those uses are.104 The power to transfer enables a titleholder to 
act on the judgment that some other party is capable of putting the 
resource to more valued uses than she is, as evidenced by their 
willingness to pay a purchase price that exceeds the value of any 
uses she is capable of engaging in. To restrain the titleholder’s 
power to transfer is to render ineffective the judgment of the person 
presumably in the best present position to determine the best person 
to control the resource, in order to give effect to the judgment of 
someone who held the resource at some time in the past. 
On the other hand, the law does not disallow all forms of 
property interest that impede free alienation. All future interests 
impede alienation, as do joint tenancy and tenancy in common.105 
Yet these devices are recognized as serving socially useful purposes, 
and instead of banning, the law limits them through doctrines like 
the rule against perpetuities.106 The norm against restraints on 
alienation is at its strongest when the restraint is one like the fee tail 
that prevents anyone from having power to alienate the property. 
Courts have been “distinctly more favorable” to restraints that 
operate by means of forfeiture because these really just amount to 
another form of future interest.107 
When it comes to transferability of easements, both the law and 
the allocative implications are somewhat different than in the case of 
plenary title to resources. Even though land law embraced 
divisibility of title, it did so warily and with an eye to the dangers of 
fragmentation. One line of doctrine held that easements were 
permissible only if made appurtenant to an adjacent tenement.108 In 
other words, detachment of use rights from the title of one resource 
was permissible only where it served to ensure that the right to 
exclude protecting that resource would not prevent another resource 
from realizing its potential utility. The appurtenant easement, once 
created, becomes part of the title to the dominant tenement and can 
only be transferred together with it.109 This ensures that the detached 
use rights remain in the hands of people in a position either to 
benefit from using them or to determine that changed use of the 
dominant tenement makes them no longer necessary. The 
requirement of appurtenance also potentially reduces search costs. 
                                                                                                             
 104. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 69, at 1763–64. 
 105. See Schnebly, supra note 42, § 26.2. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. §§ 26.8–26.9. 
 108. See, e.g., Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. 
1954) (“If we are to speak with strictest accuracy, there is no such thing as an 
‘easement in gross’ . . . since an easement presupposes two distinct tenements, one 
dominant, the other servient.”). 
 109. See 28A C.J.S. Easements § 17 (Westlaw 2013). 
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While the owner of an easement in gross could be anyone, 
anywhere, the owner of an appurtenant easement must also be the 
owner of a nearby parcel. In short, a requirement that easements be 
appurtenant minimizes the potential costs of title fragmentation. 
Easements in gross lack these anchoring aspects of appurtenance 
and have been treated by property law with greater wariness. Taking 
their cue from Ackroyd v. Smith,110 courts frequently held that 
easements in gross were personal to the holder and could not be 
transferred to another party. An attempt to transfer would simply 
extinguish the easement.111 The doctrine of nonassignability was far 
from uniform,112 however, and ultimately came to be bifurcated 
such that easements in gross for commercial purposes (usually held 
to include profits à prendre) are generally held to be assignable if 
the granting party so intended, whereas easements in gross for 
personal use are not.113 
One rationale for this distinction can be gleaned from the cases 
holding that personal easements in gross are not assignable.114 The 
concern is that when it comes to noncommercial rights, their 
exercise by persons other than the original grantee will come to 
burden the servient owner’s land beyond the contemplation of the 
original parties.115 This can been seen as an example of a broader 
phenomenon: the difficulty of specifying in advance limitations on 
the quality and intensity of use that are clear enough to be 
enforceable by third parties while flexible enough to permit the 
variations in use that would be reasonably expected to occur. 
Treating an easement as a nonassignable personal grant enables 
the titleholder to use the identity of a user as part of the definition of 
the use rights to be granted. The titleholder who grants a personal 
easement in gross intends to retain primary control over the 
character of the uses made of the property and wishes to ensure that 
the subset of uses ceded to another will remain cabined within 
narrow limits. The grantor may have knowledge as to the 
prospective grantee’s likely quantity, intensity, and manner of use 
that could not easily be specified in the form of objectively 
                                                                                                             
 110. Ackroyd v. Smith, 138 Eng. Rep. 68 (1850). 
 111. See Alan David Hegi, The Easement in Gross Revisited: Transferability 
and Divisibility Since 1945, 39 VAND. L. REV. 109, 113 (1986). 
 112. See Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n, 200 A. 646, 650–51 
(Pa. 1938) (providing examples of the existence of “much controversy in the 
courts and by textbook writers and law students as to whether [easements in gross] 
have the attribute of assignability”). 
 113. See Hegi, supra note 111, at 117–21. 
 114. For the general principle, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 4.6 (2000). 
 115. See Hegi, supra note 111, at 120. 
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enforceable grant terms. The grantor may also be able to rely on the 
expectation that future disputes about changes in these dimensions 
of use will be resolved within the context of an existing relationship. 
In any event, as the easement will entitle its owner to invade the 
property’s boundaries without further permission, the titleholder will 
want to confer this entitlement only on parties whose presence on 
the property is unlikely to be disruptive. If property doctrine were to 
hold that because such an easement is an ownership interest, it is 
subject to the norm invalidating restraints on alienation, a 
titleholder’s ability to control use in this way would be significantly 
reduced. Presumably titleholders would be less willing to grant such 
easements as a result.116 
By contrast, a titleholder who chooses to grant a land easement 
for commercial use presumably expects the rights granted to be 
exploited in such a way as to maximize their commercial value. The 
ability to use the identity of a grantee as a proxy for limitations on 
intensity and manner of use is therefore likely to be less important to 
such a titleholder. At the same time, it is likely that a commercial 
grantee will place a high value on the ability to transfer the 
easement. Without such assignability, the grantee would be unable 
to transfer control of the enterprise without becoming subject to the 
very holdup the purchase of the easement is intended to avoid. 
The Restatement (Third) of Property seemingly embraces a 
default rule of transferability for easements in gross117 but with two 
important caveats. First, an easement is not transferable where this 
would contravene the intention of the parties or purpose for which 
the easement was created, as ascertained from the language used in 
the instrument or the circumstances surrounding its creation.118 
Second, it is not transferable if the benefit is personal, which it is if 
“the relationship of the parties, consideration paid, nature of the 
servitude, or other circumstances” indicate that the parties should 
not reasonably have expected it to be transferable.119 
What the foregoing shows is that divisibility is a two-way street. 
It is valuable because it lets owners grant ownership interests in 
                                                                                                             
 116. This is the same concern that animated the enforcement of equitable 
servitudes against title successors. See Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 ER 1143 
(reasoning that absent such enforcement, “it would be impossible for an owner of 
land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains 
worthless”). It is also worth noting that easements in gross obtained by 
prescription have similarly been held to be non-assignable in that their inherent 
limits are “closely bound up in the actions and interests of the holder.” Hegi, supra 
note 111, at 120. 
 117.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, supra note 114, § 4.6. 
 118. Id. § 4.1. 
 119. Id. § 4.6. 
2013] EXCLUSIVE LICENSE IS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT 89 
 
 
 
specific uses to people who need that security. By the same token, 
however, owners may wish to protect themselves by retaining 
certain aspects of ownership—such as the power to transfer—over 
the interest granted. One of the consequences of dividing ownership, 
then, is that ownership interests need not all contain identical 
divisions of the elements of title. The assumption that ownership 
necessarily includes the power to transfer is bound up with the 
doctrine of indivisibility and perishes with it. 
F. The Spectrum of Ownership Interests 
There is more than one dimension along which ownership can 
be carved. When speaking of divisibility of title, the first thing we 
mean is the permissibility of creating separate ownership interests 
pertaining to different uses of the same resource. But in creating 
these new ownership interests, it is also possible to divide and 
withhold some of the elements of title that accompany them. This 
gives rise to a spectrum of possible combinations, each of which 
may be useful in different transacting circumstances, depending on 
what sorts of assurance the transferee needs to invest in specific 
assets and what sorts of control the transferor wishes to retain. 
1. Irrevocable Nonexclusive License 
Sometimes, resource use can be encouraged simply by a use 
privilege coupled with an immunity from revocation. This is called 
an “irrevocable nonexclusive license.”120 So long as the 
irrevocability is property-based—i.e., grounded on actual immunity 
and not merely on a contractual duty of the titleholder not to 
revoke—it would make sense (under the conceptual model 
presented here) to call this form of license an ownership interest.121 
It gives the licensee use privileges that cannot be taken away and 
that therefore limit the titleholder’s right of noninterference and 
power to revoke. It is still a license, however, because the titleholder 
retains ongoing control over the licensed uses through the sole right 
                                                                                                             
 120. “Irrevocable” means “not revocable at will.” Newman, supra note 77, at 
1115. Irrevocable interests may still be defeasible, subject to conditions 
subsequent that are specified at the time of creation. 
 121. As discussed elsewhere, the irrevocability of nonexclusive copyright 
licenses has often been conceived to be grounded not in property but in contract, 
and accordingly the 1976 Act excludes such licenses from the category “transfer 
of copyright ownership.” See Newman, supra note 77. It would be beneficial to 
recognize copyright owners as having the power to grant irrevocable nonexclusive 
licenses by unilateral deed as a form of property conveyance, and § 205(e) of the 
statute provides support for such a rule. See id. at 1146–50. 
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to exclude others from them and the exclusive power to grant the 
same use privileges to others. 
2. Exclusive License 
Another possibility is to grant, not merely an irrevocable use 
privilege, but an irrevocable use right—i.e., a privilege that is 
protected by a right of noninterference. As we have noted above, an 
easement over land is such an interest. In copyright the analogous 
interest is called an “exclusive license.”122 In either scenario, the 
grantee is given specified use privileges plus a right of 
noninterference in those activities by others. The difference between 
the two lies in the manner in which the right of noninterference is 
defined.123 Either way, the addition of a right of noninterference 
curtails the owner’s use privileges while enabling the licensee to 
unilaterally exclude others (including the licensor) from some or all 
activities within the licensed area. It is still a form of license, 
however, because the licensor retains a residuum of control over the 
use rights, consisting of the sole power to permit their transfer from 
one party to another. As suggested above, one reason why this 
control is valuable is that it enables the licensor to use the licensee’s 
identity as a proxy for qualities of use that may otherwise be 
difficult to specify as express license terms. 
                                                                                                             
 122. It is not logically necessary for an exclusive license to be irrevocable, but 
it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a licensee who valued exclusivity 
would not insist upon irrevocability as well. It is therefore assumed that all 
exclusive licenses are granted irrevocably. 
 123. In an easement, the right of noninterference is usually defined narrowly to 
prohibit only actions that actually result in direct interference with the specific 
activities privileged by the easement. Thus an easement owner will not have a 
“right to exclude” others (such as the underlying landowner) from the area covered 
by the easement altogether but a more narrowly tailored right to prevent actions 
that block his right of way. In the land context, the interfering actions (e.g., putting 
boulders on the path) are usually not the same as the easement owner’s privileged 
actions (e.g., traversing the path). In copyright, the scope of an owner’s right of 
noninterference is defined in the first instance by an enumerated list of actions that 
are deemed categorically likely to interfere with the owner’s ability to use the 
work as a basis for exchange of value. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). These bright-
line “exclusive rights” are not absolute, however, as actions that facially violate 
them are then scrutinized through the “fair use” doctrine, which seeks to reduce 
overbreadth by exempting actions that can be shown to be actually noninterfering. 
See id. § 107. Exclusive copyright licensees are given privileges to engage in some 
specified set of actions that would otherwise lie within the enumerated exclusive 
rights, and their rights of noninterference consist of categorical exclusion of others 
from those same actions, still subject to the fair use exception. See Newman, supra 
note 68, at 288–304. 
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3. Assignment 
Finally, the exclusive license can be freely transferable as well. 
If so, the transferee is vested with all powers of title over the uses in 
question, leaving the transferor no control whatsoever over their 
present or future disposition. If this method is used to effect a partial 
transfer, the copyright is effectively split into two entirely distinct 
estates, each with its own plenary powers of title. Either way, this is 
called an “assignment.” 
III. DIVISIBILITY AND COPYRIGHT 
In the previous Part, I provided a generalized conceptual model 
of ownership and divisibility explaining how it makes sense to hold 
that an exclusive license is nontransferable even though it is a form 
of “ownership” and why so holding is consistent with a policy 
permitting divisibility of title. That discussion rebuts the claim that 
Gardner is simply incoherent because it fails to give effect to the 
word “ownership.” However, even if I am correct on this score, one 
might still question whether as a practical matter it is desirable to 
recognize a copyright interest having the characteristics I ascribe to 
exclusive licenses. This Part will suggest some reasons why it might 
be. 
A. The Problem with Exclusive Licenses 
One of the greater sources of discontent with copyright 
indivisibility was the inability of exclusive licensees to bring 
unilateral suit against third-party infringers.124 Even prior to the 
1976 Act, this problem had been partially ameliorated by two 
judicial doctrines that rendered the disability less stark than a strict 
reading of indivisibility would lead one to expect. One consisted of 
judicial willingness, despite the doctrine of indivisibility, to construe 
as “assignments” (at least for the purpose of conferring standing to 
sue) certain transactions that fell short of unfettered transfer of the 
copyright in its entirety.125 In addition, even exclusive licensees not 
                                                                                                             
 124. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 1 (“The purchaser of the television rights, 
for example, may wish to enjoin a third party; if the author has gone off to India, 
the licensee is not in a happy position.”). 
 125. See id. at 15. 
There is extreme confusion in the cases and today many courts permit the 
licensee to sue, provided that he meets procedural requirements. The 
decisions are strewn with distinctions between assignments, partial 
assignments, assignments with conditions, grants, conveyances, 
“exclusive” and “mere” licenses. The distinctions are not applied 
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deemed to be assignees came to be regarded as having standing to 
institute an action for infringement, so long as the actual copyright 
owner was joined as an indispensable party to the proceeding.126 
While inconvenient, this need to join an absent copyright owner was 
not necessarily fatal to an exclusive licensee’s practical ability to 
sue, as the courts eventually recognized the possibility of 
involuntary joinder in such cases.127 Nevertheless, the potential 
difficulty of finding a desirable forum that has jurisdiction over both 
the infringer and the copyright owner fueled the desire of exclusive 
licensees to possess rights of noninterference that could be enforced 
directly.128  
One way to permit the creation of partial but independently 
enforceable exclusive rights would have been to simply abrogate the 
doctrine of indivisibility, while leaving untouched extant doctrine 
concerning the nature of a license. The result would be that partial 
exclusive rights could be granted in one of two ways: either by 
dividing the copyright estate and assigning full title to the use rights 
in question or else by granting a license with contractual exclusivity, 
which would remain subject to the traditional limitations on 
enforcement and transfer of licenses. The parties would thus be able 
to bargain over which of the two transactions to use. Owners who 
                                                                                                             
 
uniformly, and the tests become circuitous: if the grant is interpreted to 
permit suit, it is therefore an assignment; if the transferee is not permitted 
to sue, the grant is a license. To a great extent, the distinction has become 
a verbal one. 
Id. In this respect, copyright law under the doctrine of indivisibility was not far 
afield from patent law today. In patent law, whether an exclusive licensee has 
independent standing to sue continues to depend on a confusing line of cases that 
seek to discern whether the transaction has resulted in transfer of “all substantial 
rights.” See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A, 
944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 126. See, e.g., Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
 127. Id. at 613 (“[I]f the owner refuses to join, after being requested so to do, 
and is without the jurisdiction, he may be joined as an involuntary party plaintiff, 
where that is necessary in order to protect the rights of the exclusive licensee.”). 
 128. See Report on Vestal Bill to Amend the Copyright Act of 1909, H.R. REP. 
NO. 69-2225 (1927) (“The would-be users of his work, also, the publishers, the 
record makers, or the motion-picture producers do not desire to secure merely a 
license or exclusive right to use. Such licensee can not bring suit to protect the 
rights he has bargained for under existing law.”); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH 
CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF 
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW at VII.D.2.a (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 
Report] (“[T]he necessity of joining the owner of the residual rights in an 
infringement suit—is particularly troublesome. Except where the validity of the 
copyright is challenged, he usually has no interest in the suit, and his joinder 
becomes a serious obstacle when he is out of the jurisdiction.”). 
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preferred to retain undivided title could grant licenses accompanied 
only by contractual rights, while transferees who required stronger 
protection (and full transferability) could bargain for division and 
assignment. 
Another option would have been to simply alter the nature of an 
exclusive license to give licensees independent standing to sue but 
without instituting a thoroughgoing divisibility principle.129 This 
move would constitute a narrowly tailored form of divisibility, 
resulting in a single new type of ownership interest. It would address 
the biggest practical concern of exclusive licensees while preserving 
much of the benefit of indivisibility in that all use rights would still 
be traceable to a single titleholder with the sole authority to confer 
or transfer them. The downside would be that it would remain 
impossible to obtain plenary title to partial use rights, thus rendering 
certain forms of investments (particularly those contemplating 
transfer of the exclusive rights) vulnerable to hold up by copyright 
owners. 
As argued below, the legislative history shows that these were 
understood to be two distinct options—Licensee standing was not, 
as Gardner’s critics assume, simply part of what it meant to 
abrogate indivisibility but rather a step that would have been 
superfluous if the intended end result was a world in which all 
partial transfers were tantamount to assignments. In the end, the 
drafters of the 1976 Act chose to do both: They abrogated 
indivisibility, thus permitting partial assignments. And they gave 
exclusive licensees ownership of the right to exclude without giving 
them the right of transfer, thus recognizing a new form of ownership 
interest in copyright. The question remains: Why might this be 
thought desirable? 
B. License Nontransferability as a Means of Authorial Control 
As seen in the last Part, land law has tended to distinguish 
between “personal easements” and “commercial easements,” the 
former presumptively nontransferable, the latter transferable. 
Treatise author Arthur Weil described the distinction between 
copyright licenses and assignments under the 1909 Act in similar 
terms: 
A license is usually deemed personal and hence, not 
transferrable, while, since all the assignor’s rights are divested 
on assignment, an assignee may, of course, reassign. A 
licensee may not grant sublicenses unless authorized to do so 
                                                                                                             
 129. See infra note 180. 
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by the licensor. One of the tests, in doubtful cases, as to 
whether or not there has been assignment or license, is 
whether, on examination, the transaction appears to show 
reliance on the person, or character, of the party with whom 
the copyright proprietor has dealt, to such an extent that the 
right may be deemed a personal one. The fact that the licensee 
be a corporation will not of itself, overturn the presumption 
that the license was not intended to be assigned.130 
As this passage suggests, in the realm of copyright the inference 
that because a grant is “commercial,” it is therefore not “personal” 
may be weaker than it is in the realm of land use. As Jane Ginsburg 
put it, “[c]opyright is not just about getting paid; it is also about 
maintaining control, both economic and artistic, over the fate of the 
work.”131 Authors—in whom ownership of copyright is vested as an 
initial matter132—tend to be intensely interested in the form and 
manner in which their works are presented to the public, and in 
many legal regimes, they are held to have wide-ranging “moral 
rights” giving them control over these matters even apart from any 
interest they have in monetary remuneration for use of the work.133 
U.S. copyright law has recognized moral rights only grudgingly,134 
yet it is clear that authors can (and can legitimately) use their control 
of the exclusive rights granted to them to enforce artistic criteria as 
well as economic terms.135 While some authors might care only that 
the movie version of their book earn the maximum amount of 
royalties, others will place a high value on fidelity to their artistic 
                                                                                                             
 130. WEIL, supra note 28, at 549–50. See also KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 
13. 
Licenses are usually personal, contractual, rights and are strictly 
construed. An exclusive license is ordinarily held to be personal and 
where there is an indication of reliance upon the person or character of 
the licensee, it is not transferrable. But where there is no such reliance, it 
may be transferred, and the courts are also more apt to call it a partial 
assignment. 
Id. 
 131. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 381, 390 (2009). 
 132. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 133. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an 
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND.  L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 134. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (providing rights of attribution and integrity 
but only to authors of certain “works of visual art”). 
 135. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that 
botched editing of Monty Python sketch for American television violated 
provisions of license). 
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vision.136 Even if one accepts a strictly utilitarian incentive-based 
view of copyright, then there is no basis for assuming that authors 
are incentivized by money alone. 
For authors who do care about control of the manner in which 
their work is presented, the use of licensee identity as a means of 
quality control may be important due to the impossibility of fully 
specifying matters of artistic preference in objectively enforceable 
terms. For example, anyone can readily understand that it will make 
a huge difference whether the film version of one’s novel is 
produced by Steven Spielberg, Jerry Bruckheimer, or Quentin 
Tarantino—yet one would be hard pressed to write license terms 
that enforceably capture those differences.137 By licensing rather 
than assigning the film rights, an author can ensure that they remain 
in the hands of someone in whose artistic instincts she has 
confidence. 
Nontransferability has other pure economic advantages to 
authors as well. One, mentioned by the court in Gardner, is that it 
means authors will be in a better position to monitor downstream 
use so as to enforce any ongoing right to royalties.138 Another is that 
it may enable authors to extract rents as a condition of permitting 
transfers should such transfer become valuable down the road. In 
other words, just as authors can use license restrictions to enforce 
“moral rights” in the integrity of their work as presented to the 
public, they can use their control over transfer as a form of “droit de 
suite,”139 permitting them to reap some of the benefit from 
downstream uses of the work that require transfer of the license to 
unforeseen parties. Recognizing the exclusive license as a 
nontransferable interest allows authors to retain all these advantages 
                                                                                                             
 136. For example, it is well known that J.K. Rowling required as a term of the 
deal for the movie rights to the Harry Potter series that the characters be portrayed 
by British actors. See Meredith Vieira, Harry Potter: The Final Chapter, NBC 
NEWS (July 29, 2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20001720/ns/dateline_nbc-
harry_potter/t/harry-potter-final-chapter/. Rowling has also stated that she would 
have preferred not to license the films at all if doing so had required her to permit 
the use of the characters in sequels not written by her. Id. 
 137. Thus Nimmer’s confidence that protective license terms can reliably bind 
sublicensees so as to fully protect licensors’ interests should be questioned. See 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][b]. Nimmer suggests that given 
such terms there can be no harm because the sublicensees would be bound to 
engage in “the identical conduct.” Id. I am suggesting that when it comes to 
artistic expression and its presentation, what constitutes “identical conduct” from 
the licensor’s perspective may be impossible to define. 
 138. Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 139. See Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists 
Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509, 532–
44 (1995) (making the case for adoption of the droit de suite). 
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while still giving licensees the assurance of irrevocable and 
independently enforceable exclusive rights. Licensees who wish to 
be free of this form of residual control can bargain for assignment 
rather than license. We would expect the availability of the license 
option to facilitate beneficial transactions in more instances than 
would a rule in which the only way to grant exclusive rights was by 
plenary assignment.140 
C. License Nontransferability as a Default 
Some critics of Gardner might respond that this is all well and 
good but beside the point. Their position is not that exclusive 
licenses cannot be made nontransferable but merely that the statute 
makes them transferable by default. Licensors who care to obtain all 
the advantages described above by making their exclusive licenses 
nontransferable may do so by including express language to that 
effect in the license.141 Gardner’s response to this, in effect, is that 
using the term “license” to describe one’s transaction is express 
language denoting nontransferability. Licenses had long been held 
to be presumptively personal and nontransferable. Transferees who 
wish to obtain plenary title to use rights should instead seek to have 
them granted by assignment. Or else—if the parties are laboring 
under the misconception that any partial transfer is by definition a 
                                                                                                             
 140. See Cincom Sys. Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009). 
Allowing state law to permit the free assignability of patent or copyright 
licenses would “undermine the reward that encourages invention.” This 
is because any entity desiring to acquire a license could approach either 
the original inventor or one of the inventor’s licensees. Absent a federal 
rule of decision, state law would transform every licensee into a potential 
competitor with the patent or copyright holder. In such a world, the 
holder of a patent or copyright would be understandably unwilling to 
license the efforts of his work, thereby preventing potentially more 
efficient uses of the invention by others. 
Id. 
 141. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17 n.97. 
There are many ways of monitoring or controlling the use of a transferred 
copyright right through contractual provisions that stop well short of 
depriving the exclusive licensee of its ownership rights. . . . A licensor 
may include a no-assignment clause in its license; it can contractually 
require consent before re-conveyance; or it can require notification of 
transfers, with breach of any such obligations constituting grounds for 
termination. 
Id. at 34 n.200 (“For example, an exclusive copyright license, as a transfer of 
copyright ownership, is transferable under federal law. The license’s contractual 
terms, however, could vary that default rule and provide that it is not transferable, 
and this prohibition on assignment would be enforceable under state law.”). See 
also Fellmeth, supra note 6. 
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license—the burden should be on the party seeking powers of 
transfer to ensure that the license terms state this. No one denies a 
licensor’s power to make the license transferable if she chooses. 
At this point the argument seems to merely concern the default 
setting of a rule that everyone agrees the parties should be able to 
alter by means of express action. The question is: In cases like 
Gardner, where the parties neither use the term “assignment” nor 
expressly address transferability, which should be the presumptive 
result? A full vetting of this question would want to examine the 
relative likelihood and cost to the parties of errors under either rule. 
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I offer 
three reasons suggesting why a default rule of nontransferability 
might be preferable. 
The first is that if a thumb is to be put on the scale, it should be 
one that impedes rather than accelerates the fragmentation of 
ownership interests. Unfettered subdivision and transfer of exclusive 
rights in a single work pose serious risks of fragmentation, in which 
the costs of tracing ownership and assembling needed use rights can 
easily render potentially valuable projects infeasible.142 Of course, 
such division and transfer of rights may also facilitate valuable 
projects, which is why the law permits such divisibility in the first 
place. A default rule of nontransferability, however, does not 
prevent owners from choosing to confer the power of transfer on 
their grantees when they regard the benefits as outweighing the 
costs. All it does is seek to ensure that fragmentation will not 
proceed without this question having been expressly considered at 
each juncture.  
Second, given that authors are often individuals negotiating with 
relatively more sophisticated institutional actors such as publishers or 
studios, setting the default on the side of license nontransferability 
may also serve a salutary, information-forcing function.143 If the 
transferee values the right to transfer, it will be required to raise the 
issue and bargain over it, thus alerting the author to its existence and 
importance. Protecting authorial control in this way is worthwhile 
because copyright seeks to foster a market-based division of labor in 
which individual authors can earn the wherewithal to specialize in 
creative production. Placing the thumb on this side of the scale gives 
authors marginally more leverage, and ensuring that the copyright 
                                                                                                             
 142. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 141–43 (2008). 
 143. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
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system actually benefits authors is crucial to its perceived 
legitimacy.144 
Nimmer on Copyright actually illustrates this point in a 
hypothetical intended to show the undesirability of the Gardner 
rule: 
If [Gardner is] followed literally, Jerome Siegel and Joseph 
Shuster, creators of Superman, could retain literary rights 
while licensing film and television rights therein exclusively 
to Warner Bros.—but the studio would not be able to convey 
performance rights in the film produced thereby to Edwards 
Theater Chain, broadcast rights therein to NBC, and all other 
rights necessary to exploit the material for which it 
bargained. To the extent that motion picture exhibition and 
television rights fall within the scope of the exclusive 
license, there is no reason to require Warner Bros. itself to 
engage in all exploitations.145 
As between Siegel and Shuster on the one hand and Warner 
Bros. on the other, presumably the studio is in a better position to 
bear the burden of ensuring that any rights crucial to the exercise of 
their film and television license are included in the grant. Nimmer is 
surely correct that there is no reason to require Warner Bros. itself to 
engage in all exploitations, but the Gardner rule does not threaten 
any such result. At most, it would require Warner Bros. to obtain 
(and perhaps pay something extra for) the authors’ consent to any 
sublicensing arrangements that it had failed to include in the original 
negotiation. 
Very likely, however, it would not require even that. One reason 
why Nimmer’s hypothetical does not seem to be a problem in 
practice is that Warner Bros. would have a strong argument that 
authorization to make the particular types of sublicenses at issue in 
this hypothetical was implicitly contained within the scope of the 
grant. The rule that licenses are nontransferable without the 
licensor’s consent need not mean that such consent must always be 
                                                                                                             
 144. See Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 382 (describing the manner in which 
copyright comes to be delegitimized when it can be portrayed as inuring primarily 
to the benefit of entities other than authors). 
If authors have any role in this scenario, it is at most a walk-on, a cameo 
appearance as victims of monopolist “content owners.” The disappearance 
of the author moreover justifies disrespect for copyright—after all, those 
downloading teenagers aren’t ripping off the authors and performers, the 
major record companies have already done that. 
Id. 
 145. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][4][b]. 
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granted expressly.146 There is a body of doctrine concerning the 
circumstances under which an author’s consent to certain uses of a 
work will be implied from the context of a transaction.147 Where the 
purpose for which a work was created and licensed manifestly 
requires the involvement of third parties, authorization for the 
transfers necessary to that purpose can be implied, with the burden 
on the licensee to show that such implication is appropriate.148 There 
is a difference between enlisting the aid of third parties to take 
actions in furtherance of the role one has been authorized to carry 
out and completely transferring that role to some other party without 
the author’s consent. 
The final reason is, to borrow a phrase, that “doctrine 
matters.”149 Historically, the concepts “license” and “assignment” 
have always meant very different things, and they still mean very 
different things in other areas of property law. These terms reflect a 
particular understanding of the structure of property institutions that 
informs the way people conceive of their relations to each other and 
to resources. According to this understanding, each resource has an 
ultimate titleholder who is empowered either to grant limited-use 
privileges or to transfer ownership outright and to do so with regard 
to either part or all of the resource in question. When parties use the 
term “license” to characterize a transaction, it likely means that they 
understand the owner to be retaining some form of ongoing control 
over the rights transferred, and this is an understanding that should 
                                                                                                             
 146. Judicial statements of the rule sometimes assert that the consent to transfer 
must be express, see, e.g., Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 
1984), but as I explain below and more fully in other work, courts in fact often 
recognize implied consent to transfer.  See Newman, supra note 35. 
 147. See, e.g., Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Much like Nimmer’s hypothetical, this case involved a film producer who made a 
film involving copyrighted material and turned it over to a distributor. Even in the 
absence of a valid “transfer of copyright ownership,” the producer was found to 
have an implied license that permitted him to distribute the film. The opinion does 
not address squarely whether this means the distributor would have a valid defense 
as sublicensee to a claim of infringement against it, but this seems to be the clear 
implication given that the distributor was also a named defendant. For a full 
discussion of this case and of implied licenses in general, see Newman, supra note 
35. 
 148. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch, 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(company licensed to make collector’s plates based on film had implied authority 
to solicit artwork for that purpose from third parties); Key Maps v. Pruitt, 470 F. 
Supp. 33, 39 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (stating that implied license to reproduce map 
included permission to order reproduction from third parties). 
 149. See Haemmerli, supra note 6 (entitled “Why Doctrine Matters: Patent and 
Copyright Licensing and the Meaning of Ownership in Federal Context”). 
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be encouraged.150 When they use the term “assignment,” they likely 
view the assignor as relinquishing ownership. The drafters of the 
1976 Copyright Act chose to continue using these terms knowing 
their implications, even as they acted to change some of them. To 
unnecessarily obliterate the distinction impoverishes our conceptual 
vocabulary, diminishing our ability to speak and think clearly.151 
There is, moreover, an arguable contradiction in contending that 
exclusive licenses must be transferable because they are legally 
indistinguishable from plenary assignments of title to the licensed 
rights but then asserting that these assignments can nevertheless be 
made nontransferable simply by placing restrictions on transfer in 
the terms of the license. If an exclusive license necessarily 
constitutes a plenary assignment of title to a now distinct object of 
ownership, it arguably follows that any attempts by the owner to 
fetter downstream transfers are void as impermissible restraints on 
alienation.152 While I do not claim that this conclusion is 
                                                                                                             
 150. See Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 
1960) (use of term “licenses” in contract precluded construing it to affect 
assignment); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that where a copyright owner specifies that a transferee of a copy of a 
software program is granted a license, this weighs in favor of finding the user to be 
a licensee rather than owner of the copy transferred). The issue of first sale 
doctrine raised in Vernor shows the ambiguity inherent in the term “owner.” For 
purposes of first sale, the question is whether a particular user is the “owner” of a 
“copy,” and for purposes of that doctrine, it is clear that “owner” and “licensee” 
are mutually exclusive categories. See id. (describing holding as pertaining to 
circumstances where software user is a “licensee rather than an owner”); 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a), (d) (2006) (distinguishing between the rights of an “owner of a 
particular copy” and one who acquires possession by “rental, lease, loan, or 
otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it”). As seen, however, the 1976 Act 
makes it impossible to treat “copyright owner” and “exclusive licensee” as two 
mutually exclusive categories. 
 151. See generally Henry Smith, On The Economy of Concepts in Property, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012) (arguing that such doctrinal concepts can be useful 
tools allowing decisions about a complex world in the face of information costs by 
organizing factual complexity into modules that omit enough context to be 
cognitively manageable). 
 152. See supra note 101. Haemmerli avoids this result by treating the term 
“prohibiting transfer” as a contractual term enforceable under state law. See 
Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 34 n.200 (“For example, an exclusive copyright 
license, as a transfer of copyright ownership, is transferable under federal law. The 
license’s contractual terms, however, could vary that default rule and provide that 
it is not transferable, and this prohibition on assignment would be enforceable 
under state law.”). If it is merely a contractual obligation not to transfer, however, 
it is not clear why the licensee cannot transfer good title to a sublicensee and then 
simply pay damages for his breach. See, e.g., Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. 
Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that anti-
assignment clause was ineffective to prevent transfer of license, giving rise at most 
to breach of contract claim by licensor). Note that the Ninth Circuit opinion in 
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unavoidable, permitting exclusive licensors to grant a power of 
transfer (thus creating an assignment) is uncontroversial and 
threatens no damage to the coherency of property doctrine. 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT READ THE STATUTE CORRECTLY 
The previous two Parts have provided an account as to why it 
would not be absurd for Congress to draft a statute that treated 
exclusive licenses as ownership interests, while still leaving them 
distinct from assignments and not rendering them presumptively 
transferable. This Part shows why this is in fact the best reading of 
the actual statute. 
A. The Statute Does Not Prescribe that Exclusive Licenses Shall 
Constitute Unqualified Ownership Interests for All Purposes 
The key provision upon which critics of Gardner base their 
claim is § 101, in which Congress provides definitions for various 
terms used in the statute, including the following: 
A ‘‘transfer of copyright ownership’’ is an assignment, 
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, 
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the 
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it 
is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a 
nonexclusive license.153 
The claim is that this language affirmatively obliterates any legal 
distinction between exclusive licenses and assignments, including 
ones rooted in background principles of property law that are not 
expressly addressed in the statute.154 As Alice Haemmerli put it, 
“[T]he federal Copyright Act specifies that an exclusive license 
constitutes an unqualified transfer of copyright ownership.”155 This 
is an over reading of the text. The provision indisputably tells us that 
an “exclusive license” falls within the term “transfer of copyright 
ownership” as defined for purposes of the statute. It does not, 
                                                                                                             
 
Foad does not address at all the federal doctrine of license nontransferability, even 
though it purports to apply a framework under which state contract law must give 
way to conflicting federal law or policy concerning copyright. See id. at 827–28. 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 154. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the statute as having 
“equated an exclusive license with an assignment, as a form of copyright 
‘transfer’”). 
 155. Id. at 2 n.6 (citing § 101 as the sole support for this statement). See also 
id. at 7 (referring to the “robust and unambiguous phrasing” of § 101). 
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however, “specify” one way or another whether such “ownership” 
may be qualified or “unqualified.” To omit any express mention of 
qualifications is not to “specify” that a thing is “unqualified.” 
The claim that § 101 renders exclusive licenses identical in all 
respects to assignments must be based on one of two logical 
readings of the text. The first would be the argument that because 
“exclusive licenses” are “transfers of copyright ownership” and 
“assignments” are also “transfers of copyright ownership,” it must 
follow that “exclusive licenses” are “assignments.” In other words, 
L=T and A=T, therefore L=A. This is an obvious error; the correct 
way to describe the provision logically would be LJT and AJT, 
from which one cannot conclude LJA. 
Haemmerli does not appear to be making this facile error;156 
instead her unstated reasoning appears to be this: 
(1) The statute specifies that an exclusive license is a form 
of “copyright ownership” and does not qualify that 
statement. 
(2) As a matter of background law, the term “ownership” 
necessarily denotes a relationship conferring full powers 
of control over the owned interest, including unfettered 
powers of transfer. 
(3) Therefore, the statute affirmatively prescribes that an 
exclusive copyright licensee shall have unfettered 
powers of transfer. 
Each of the premises of this argument is mistaken. 
The first premise is mistaken because a statutory definition of a 
term is always “qualified” by the understanding that Congress is 
defining the term only for purposes of its express use in that statute. 
Section 101 begins with the phrase: “Except as otherwise provided 
in this title, as used in this title, the following terms and their variant 
forms mean the following[.]”157 The definition of “transfer of 
copyright ownership” provided in § 101 has no effect but to tell us 
what referents the term has as used elsewhere in Title 17. Inclusion 
of exclusive licenses within this definition does not constitute a self-
executing command that all legal attributes of “ownership,” from 
whatever source derived, shall henceforth be applied to exclusive 
                                                                                                             
 156. At least not in the passage already quoted. She may be making it 
elsewhere. See id. at 15. “In other words, the drafters explicitly saw the exclusive 
license as a transfer; and a transfer was ‘an assignment . . . or any other 
conveyance or alienation by which ownership of a copyright or of any of the 
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright changes hands . . . .’” Id. (quoting H. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1963 COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 31 (Comm. Print 1963)). 
 157. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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copyright licenses. Rather, it constitutes a command only that any 
attributes of “copyright ownership” expressly designated as such by 
Title 17 shall be applied to exclusive licenses. The definition itself 
has no prescriptive force until the defined term is actually “used in 
this title” to prescribe something. 
The second premise is mistaken because, as explained in Part 
II.E., the term “ownership” does not necessarily imply that the 
owner has unfettered powers of transfer with regard to the owned 
interest. 
A final, seemingly obvious problem with the claim that § 101 
obliterates all distinction between exclusive licenses and 
assignments is that the provision also includes “mortgages” within 
the definition of “transfers of copyright ownership.” Does this mean 
that a mortgage too constitutes an “unqualified transfer of copyright 
ownership”? Did the 1976 Act affirmatively obliterate all previously 
understood distinctions between the legal consequences of 
mortgaging a copyright and those of assigning one? This claim 
would have implications that are far-reaching and seemingly 
uncontemplated by anyone. Yet it rests on precisely the same textual 
foundation as the claim that an exclusive copyright license is now 
no different from an assignment.158 
B. The Statute Does Not Prescribe that All “Copyright Owners” 
Shall Have Powers of Transfer 
So what does Title 17 affirmatively prescribe with regard to the 
attributes of copyright ownership? One important thing it does is to 
state that the copyright estate is divisible: 
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, 
including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by 
section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) 
and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive 
right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the 
protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by 
this title.159 
                                                                                                             
 158. In fact, the inclusion of mortgages within the term “ownership” is 
problematic (though less so) even for the narrower reading of the statute, for it 
implies the result that a copyright mortgagee has power—even absent any 
foreclosure—to “do or to authorize” the acts covered by the exclusive rights listed 
in § 106, as well as the right to sue for infringement granted by § 501. There is no 
indication that anyone intended this result and no evidence of any attempt by a 
mortgagee to assert such rights. 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006). 
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“Copyright owner”, with respect to any one of the exclusive 
rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that 
particular right.160 
These provisions serve to do away with the doctrine of copyright 
indivisibility, which had previously required ownership of all the 
rights conferred by copyright in a single work to remain unitary. 
It is important to notice, however, that the divisibility of the 
copyright into multiple, separately owned interests does not in itself 
tell us anything about what specific powers the status of 
“ownership” confers with regard to one of those interests. Section 
201 tells us that subdivisions of the particular rights granted by 
copyright “may be transferred . . . and owned separately” and that 
whatever “protection and remedies” are accorded to “copyright 
owners” by Title 17 are equally accorded to such owners of 
particular rights. Section 101 states more broadly that anything 
ascribed generally to “copyright owners” in the statute applies just 
as well to owners of particular rights. Nothing in these quoted 
provisions, however, says anything about the actual content of the 
“protection and remedies” that are accorded to copyright owners or 
about any other powers that the statute affirmatively confers on that 
status. 
Many other provisions in Title 17, however, do give specific 
content to the status of “copyright owner.” The most salient of these 
include the following: 
• “[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize” any of the 
activities enumerated in Section 106, such as 
reproduction or distribution of the protected work.161 • A copyright notice giving “the name of the owner of 
copyright in the work” (as well as other required 
elements) will be effective to gain the evidentiary and 
other consequences accorded to such notice under the 
statute.162 • “[T]he owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in 
the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim 
. . . .”163 • “The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right 
under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for 
                                                                                                             
 160. Id. § 101. 
 161. Id. § 106. 
 162. Id. §§ 401–406. 
 163. Id. § 408. 
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any infringement of that particular right committed while 
he or she is the owner of it.”164 
All of these things fit comfortably within the category of “protection 
and remedies” and provide content to the statement in § 201 that 
owners of particular rights get the benefit of the “protection and 
remedies accorded to the copyright owner under this title.”165 
Nowhere, however, does Title 17 prescribe that anyone who 
qualifies as a “copyright owner” under the statute shall necessarily 
have the power to transfer the copyright (or the particular right that 
she owns) to someone else. Instead, § 201(d)(1) states: 
The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole 
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of 
law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal 
property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.166 
As we have already seen, § 201(d)(2) adds: 
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, 
including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by 
section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) 
and owned separately.167 
Thus the statute states in passive voice that copyright interests “may 
be transferred” but remains conspicuously silent with regard to who 
has the power to transfer them. Contrast this with the active manner 
in which the statute confers standing to sue: 
The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a 
copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any 
                                                                                                             
 164. Id. § 501(b). 
 165. Critics read Gardner to hold that exclusive licensees are only given 
standing to sue and no other aspects of ownership. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, 
at 17–18 (asserting that Gardner makes exclusive licensees into beneficial owners 
whose entitlements are “purely remedial” and that this creates various 
redundancies and inconsistencies in the statute); Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 22 
(arguing against the notion that Congress “intended the § 501(b) rights to be the 
only ‘protections and remedies’ conferred upon an exclusive licensee”). The 
opinion does not say this, however. To the contrary, it expressly states that the 
“protection and remedies” language of § 201(d)(2) “includes, among other things, 
the right for an exclusive licensee to sue in his own name under Chapter 5 of the 
1976 Act.” Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 780 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis 
added).  
 166. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. § 201(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
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infringement of that particular right committed while he or 
she is the owner of it.168 
The import of § 201(d)(1) is that Congress chose not to write its 
own general rules of property conveyance to govern copyright but 
decided rather to leave existing background principles in place.169 
Accordingly, the 1976 Act does not provide general definitions of 
terms like “ownership,” “license,” “mortgage,” or “assignment,” and 
thus their content must be supplied by reference to existing doctrine, 
including the existing doctrine on whether licensees have powers of 
transfer. An exclusive licensee is designated a “copyright owner” as 
that term is used in the statute and therefore has all the powers 
expressly given by the statute to holders of this status, but the 1976 
Act does not expressly give powers of transfer to anyone. Instead, it 
leaves the question of a licensee’s power to transfer unaddressed and 
cannot therefore be read to overturn the existing precedent holding 
that copyright licenses are presumptively personal and 
nontransferable.170 
                                                                                                             
 168. Id. § 501(b). This difference in language shows that William Patry is 
incorrect to assert that “Congress addressed the question of an exclusive licensee’s 
right to transfer rights without the author’s permission both in Section 201(d)(1) 
and in Section 101.” PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:103. The only thing Congress 
addressed in § 201(d)(1) is the legal means by which an exclusive license may be 
transferred, not the circumstances under which an exclusive licensee has power to 
do so. 
 169. Cf. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (applying 1909 
Act and holding that despite provision in federal copyright act authorizing 
assignment by written instrument, dispute as to validity and scope of such an 
assignment did not arise under federal law). 
 170. For the contrary view, see Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 16.  
One could as easily (and more accurately) conclude, however, that with 
the knowledge of the 1909 Act, the judicial doctrine of indivisibility, and 
the non-transferability of nonexclusive licenses in hand, Congress 
carefully stated and restated that copyright rights could be transferred in 
part and owned separately; that the owner of a copyright right could 
transfer it; and that an exclusive licensee (in explicit contrast to a 
nonexclusive licensee) was a transferee and the owner of whatever right 
was exclusively licensed to it, implying that, as such, it could transfer its 
rights. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). As this section indicates, Haemmerli goes wrong in 
characterizing Congress as having “stated and re-stated” that “the owner of a 
copyright right could transfer it . . . .” Id. See supra Part II (explaining why she is 
wrong that being an “owner” necessarily implies that one can transfer one’s 
rights). 
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C. Why Does the Statute Include Exclusive Licenses Within the 
Definition of “Transfer of Copyright Ownership”? 
The term “transfer of copyright ownership” serves as a vehicle 
for accomplishing two things in the 1976 Act. The first, most 
straightforward one, is to define a category of transactions, which 
then serves as the subject of various provisions prescribing the roles 
that formal writing and recordation are to play in those transactions 
and the consequences that are to follow from complying with or 
omitting them.171 These provisions constitute enumerated exceptions 
to the statute’s general reliance (expressed in § 201(d)(1)) on 
unstated background principles of property law to govern copyright 
transactions. 
As we have seen, the term also implicitly serves to help define a 
category of statusholders (i.e., copyright owners), which then serves 
as the subject for various provisions conferring rights and powers on 
those statusholders. That the term serves this second function is 
expressed only obliquely, through the (reasonable) inference that 
anyone who receives something that the statute defines as a “transfer 
of copyright ownership” must therefore be a “copyright owner” for 
purposes of the statute. While § 101 provides a separate definition 
for the term “copyright owner,” this serves only to make clear that 
this term includes owners of particular rights as well as owners of 
the copyright as a whole.172  
Why was the law drafted in this way? It is impossible to know 
for certain, but it is clear that among the desired goals of the 1976 
Act were those of providing for divisibility of copyright and of 
clarifying the roles of notice and recordation in such a regime.173 An 
additional goal—as explained below, one not necessarily 
encompassed in divisibility—was to give exclusive licensees 
independent standing to enforce their exclusive rights against 
infringing parties. This latter goal could have been achieved by 
directly saying so, as one earlier proposed bill had in fact done.174 
Instead, the drafters achieved it by (indirectly) including exclusive 
                                                                                                             
 171. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006) (providing that these transactions are not 
valid unless executed in a writing signed by the grantor); Id. § 205(a) (providing 
for recordation of such transactions); Id. § 205(e) (providing that rights granted by 
such transactions may be trumped by a prior nonexclusive license that was granted 
in a writing signed by the licensor); Id. § 708 (providing for payment of fees to the 
Register of Copyright when such transactions are recorded). 
 172. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“‘Copyright owner’, with respect to any one of 
the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular 
right.”). 
 173. See infra Part V.B. 
 174. See infra note 180. 
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licensees within the term “copyright owners” and then giving (in § 
501(b)) all such “owners” the right to institute actions for 
infringement. This inclusion also made sense with regard to the 
other function of the term “transfer of copyright ownership” because 
giving exclusive licensees independent standing to sue made it 
desirable that exclusive licenses now be subject to the same 
formalities and recordation provisions as other transfers that may 
result in one party asserting a claim of priority over another. 
In certain respects, this was a fairly economical and elegant way 
of drafting the statute to achieve these desired goals. Unfortunately, 
in other respects this dual function of the defined term “transfer of 
copyright ownership” may imply results the drafters did not intend. 
One possible such problem, noted above, is that of copyright 
mortgages. It is easy to see why one would want mortgages to be 
subject to the transactional provisions concerning written formalities 
and recordation. It seems highly unlikely, however, that anyone 
intended mortgagees to thereby obtain the current positive status of 
“copyright owners,” thus statutorily entitling them to exploit the 
protected work and sue over its infringement. 
The other unfortunate aspect of the drafters’ strategy is the one 
on which this Article focuses—the confusion it has caused with 
respect to the distinction between an exclusive license and an 
assignment. This Part has shown that a careful reading of the statute 
eliminates the inference that it commands wholesale abrogation of 
this distinction. Next, Part V will try to show that the legislative 
history is consistent with this reading of the statute. 
V. GARDNER’S READING OF THE STATUTE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Critics of Gardner assert that it runs directly counter to the 
policy of divisibility expressed in the legislative history.175 This Part 
argues that this claim is based on misreadings similar to those that 
plague the critics’ reading of the statute itself. The first point is that 
divisibility and licensee standing were long understood to be two 
separate issues that might stand or fall independently of each other. 
As explained above, the 1976 Act implements both and uses the 
defined term “transfer of copyright ownership” as a vehicle for 
doing so. Once one pauses to ask the question why one would 
bother to both institute divisibility and give exclusive licensees 
standing to sue, it becomes apparent that this approach to the goals 
of the statute would make little sense if there was no desire to 
preserve a distinction between license and assignment. 
                                                                                                             
 175. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 6. 
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Part V.B examines in detail the 1961 Report of the Register, 
which discusses the policy of divisibility and is cited by Gardner’s 
critics as showing that the opinion was wrong. The Report shows 
that, while an exclusive licensee’s inability to bring independent suit 
was clearly regarded as a problem to be addressed, the restrictions 
on the ability to transfer were never mentioned and were not 
relevant to any of the problems the Register discussed. Far from 
supporting the claim that the statute was intended to destroy all 
distinction between exclusive license and assignment, the Report—
like the final statute—is very precise in enumerating the specific 
types of provisions that it recommends be applied to both categories 
of transaction. 
A. Divisibility and Licensee Standing Are, and Were Always 
Understood to Be, Two Separate Issues 
Two distinct goals that were under consideration from the 
earliest efforts to revise the 1909 Copyright Act can be stated as 
follows: 
(1) To permit copyright owners to divide the copyright 
estate into distinct subsets of use rights, the full title to 
which could be assigned separately; 
(2) To give exclusive licensees standing to sue. 
These two goals are clearly stated—and distinguished from each 
other—in Representative Vestal’s reports on the revision bill he 
sponsored in 1926: 
The bill enacts that “All rights comprised in a copyright are 
several, distinct, and severable,” and provides that such 
assignment or sale of any one or more of the author’s rights 
comprised in his copyright may legally be made, and it 
further provides that where only a license to use may have 
been conceded, the licensee may sue to protect his right 
under the license, if such right is infringed. 176 
 
[At present, the copyright owner] cannot sell outright to any 
person such separate rights. Furthermore, the licensee 
cannot bring suit to protect the right he may have secured 
under a license from the owner of the general copyright. It is 
to remedy this difficulty that this legislation is proposed.177 
                                                                                                             
 176. See H.R. REP. NO. 69-2225, at 234 (1927) (emphasis added). 
 177. H.R. REP. NO. 70-1103, at 2 (1928) (emphasis added). 
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Note that while the exclusive licensees’ inabilities to sue are clearly 
stated as a concern of the bill, such licensees’ well-established 
inabilities to transfer without permission are not. This is striking 
because the actual language of the bill in question would, if 
anything, seem to give stronger textual support than does the 1976 
Act to the claim that all legal distinction between exclusive license 
and assignment was being abolished. The Vestal bill would have 
provided: 
Where, under any assignment of less than the entire 
copyright or under an exclusive license, the assignee or 
licensee becomes entitled to any right comprised in 
copyright or to the exercise thereof, the assignee or licensee 
to the extent of the rights so assigned or conferred shall be 
treated for all purposes, including the right to sue, as the 
owner of the several and distinct rights and parts of the 
copyright so assigned or conferred . . . .178 
Arthur Kaminstein, in his definitive 1957 study of divisibility on 
behalf of the Copyright Office,179 also recognized the question of an 
exclusive licensee’s right to sue as separate from the question of 
whether copyright should be made divisible and queried whether 
divisibility would be “necessary or advisable” were such a right 
provided.180 This is significant because it illustrates the point that 
one might favor granting licensees the ability to sue while being 
wary of the consequences of permitting plenary assignment of 
partial use rights. It is also telling that although Kaminstein 
describes the doctrinal limitations on transferability of licenses,181 
nowhere does he suggest that it would be desirable to eliminate 
them or that doing so is one of the goals of divisibility. 
                                                                                                             
 178. H.R. REP. NO. 70-10434, § 9 (1926) (emphasis added). 
 179. Abraham L. Kaminstein, S. Judiciary Comm., 86th Cong., Study No. 11 
Divisibility of Copyrights, in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 11–13 (1957). 
Kaminstein was at the time Chief of the Examining Division of the Copyright 
Office. (He later served as Register of Copyrights from 1960 to 1971.) This was 
one of a series of studies pertaining to revision of copyright law that had been 
commissioned by the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. See S. Res. No. 89-240. 
 180. Kaminstein, supra note 179, at 28–29. Indeed, one of the earlier proposed 
revision bills had taken this approach, providing for licensee standing but not 
embracing divisibility of title. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-10976, § 13 (1932) (“Any 
license granted by the owner of a copyright work shall be deemed to secure to the 
licensee, to the extent of his interest, any and all remedies given by this act to any 
owner of the copyright. The licensee shall be entitled to proceed in his own name 
and behalf against any infringer of his rights under the license, without joining in 
such proceeding the owner of the copyright or any person claiming under him.”). 
 181. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 13. 
2013] EXCLUSIVE LICENSE IS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT 111 
 
 
 
B. The 1961 Report of the Register is Consistent with Gardner 
In 1961, the Register of Copyrights transmitted its Report on the 
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law to the House 
Committee on the Judiciary.182 The Report discusses divisibility at 
three points: in its opening section entitled “The Report In 
Summary,” in Chapter 8 of the Report (on “Ownership of 
Copyright”), and in the “Summary of Recommendations” attached 
to the Report as Appendix B. Critics of Gardner have invoked the 
Report as demonstrating that transferability of exclusive licenses 
was a key facet of the policy of divisibility.183 This Subsection 
engages in a close reading of the Report to show that the claim is 
unfounded. 
a. The Opening Summary 
The brief discussion in the opening summary begins by stating 
that the Report “would leave unchanged in most respects the present 
law regarding the ownership of copyright.”184 Given this, it would 
seem that failure to expressly address some established aspect of 
existing law—such as license nontransferability—implies the 
authors were not recommending that it be changed. The opening 
summary gives no indication that such a change was contemplated. 
It states the view that copyright should be made divisible “so that 
ownership of the various rights comprised in a copyright could be 
                                                                                                             
 182. 1961 Report, supra note 128.  
 183. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 17. 
The Register’s statement expresses unequivocally the objective of 
making exclusive licensees full-fledged owners of their rights. In 
deciding that the entitlements of an exclusive licensee of copyright 
consist of anything less than the full panoply of ownership rights, 
including the ability to transfer at will, Gardner subverts that goal. Its 
holding that “the state of the law remains unchanged” as to a licensee’s 
entitlement to re-convey is mistaken, because the purpose of defining an 
exclusive license as a transfer of ownership was to change the state of the 
law as to such licenses. 
Id. 
 184. See 1961 Report, supra note 128, at 4. 
Ownership and divisibility.—The report would leave unchanged in most 
respects the present law regarding the ownership of copyright. Copyright 
would be made divisible, however, so that ownership of the various 
rights comprised in a copyright could be assigned separately. Under the 
present law an assignment is not effective against third persons without 
notice unless it is recorded, and this provision would be extended to 
exclusive licenses and partial assignments. 
Id. at vii.  
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assigned separately.”185 The only other statement thought important 
enough to include in the opening summary is the following: “Under 
the present law an assignment is not effective against third persons 
without notice unless it is recorded, and this provision would be 
extended to exclusive licenses and partial assignments.”186 This last 
sentence is telling, for it provides the key explanation of why 
exclusive licenses are lumped together with assignments in the 
statute: in order to provide that all transactions resulting in the 
transfer of exclusive rights directly enforceable against third parties 
will be subject to the same rules concerning recordation and 
constructive notice. Note too that the sentence treats exclusive 
licenses and partial assignments as two distinct categories, to each of 
which the recordation requirement must be extended. 
b. The Section on Divisibility 
The full discussion of divisibility in Chapter 8 of the Report 
states that “indivisibility has created a number of troublesome 
problems,” which it enumerates as the following:  
(1) Uncertainty as to whether the copyright in a periodical 
covered the individual contributions, where all rights to 
those works were not assigned to the publisher; 
(2) Uncertainty as to whether the provisions pertaining to 
recordation of assignments applied also to partial 
transfers of rights; 
(3) Ambiguity as to whether proceeds from a partial transfer 
should be taxed as capital gains or ordinary income; and 
(4) The inability of a partial transferee to sue for 
infringement without joining the owner of the residual 
rights as a party to the suit.187 
None of these problems was in any way caused by the 
presumptive inability of an exclusive licensee to transfer the license. 
All but one of them correspond to express provisions in the ultimate 
statute that either governs “transfer[s] of copyright ownership” 
(recordation)188 or confers “protection and remedies” on “copyright 
                                                                                                             
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 62. 
 188. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2006). Note that recordation of exclusive licenses 
would be desirable regardless of the rule concerning downstream license 
transferability because it serves equally to resolve priority conflicts among 
multiple exclusive licensees who purport to have received their rights directly 
from the original owner.  
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owners” (power to affix effective notice in one’s own name189 and 
standing to sue). The tax issue did not turn on downstream 
transferability190 and does not appear to have played any significant 
role in the ultimate drafting of the 1976 Act.191 The last of the 
four—licensee standing—is identified by the Report as “particularly 
troublesome.”192 There is nothing to indicate that the authors 
regarded transferability as necessarily linked to enforcement rights 
however, and as explained above, there is no logical reason to do so. 
The Report then describes its “[p]roposals for divisible 
copyright.” First, it states: 
We believe that the copyright owner should be in a position 
to assign any one or more of his rights without assigning the 
entire copyright. And a person who acquires a particular 
right exclusively should be treated as the owner of that right, 
though he is not the owner of other rights. This would bring 
the statute in line with commercial practice.193 
This statement that “a person who acquires a particular right 
exclusively should be treated as the owner of that right” is the sort of 
thing Gardner’s critics see as expressing intent to abrogate the rule 
of nontransferability.194 The entire weight of this conclusion, 
however, is based on the mistaken premise that “ownership” 
necessarily denotes transferability. This cannot have been what was 
meant, however, given that at the time licenses were not transferable 
as a matter of “commercial practice.” Moreover, the Report itself 
goes on to specify what in practical terms is meant in this context by 
treating someone “as the owner of that right”: 
                                                                                                             
 189. See id. § 401–406. This issue was rendered much less important by the 
new statute because failure to print proper notice no longer thrusts a work into the 
public domain. See id. § 102(a) (stating that copyright “subsists” upon fixation of 
work in a tangible medium).  
 190. See Lorna G. Margolis, Divisibility in Relation to Income Tax, appended 
to KAMINSTEIN, supra note 24, supp. 1, at 55–56. The rule adopted was that all 
transfers by authors, whether total or partial, were treated as ordinary income. 
Transfers by persons having a cost basis different from the author, by contrast, 
would count as a capital gain if they were irrevocable for the entire copyright term 
and granted in exchange for an up-front, lump-sum payment rather than ongoing 
royalties or other consideration made contingent on subsequent use.  
 191. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 contains no appearance of the string “tax.” 
 192. Report, supra note 128, at 62. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 15 (citing this language). 
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Specifically, we propose that the law provide: 
(1) That any of the rights comprised in a copyright may be 
assigned separately. 
(2) That the statutory provisions governing “assignments” 
extend to exclusive licenses and other exclusive transfers 
of any right. 
(3) That the assignee of any particular right may sue in his 
own name alone for infringement of that right; but the 
court, in its discretion, may require or permit the joinder 
or intervention of any person appearing to have an interest 
in the suit.195 
The authors thus urge that the statute adopt divisibility, clarify that 
assignees of partial rights have standing to sue, and extend all the 
“statutory provisions” governing assignments to exclusive licenses. 
From what has gone before, it is clear that the “statutory provisions” 
in question would be ones providing independent enforcement 
rights, permitting partial transferees to affix effective notice in their 
own name and providing for recordation. No statutory provision 
specifying that the “owner” of an assignment has full power of 
transfer is contemplated, presumably because no one doubted this as 
a matter of background law. As there is no need for a statutory 
provision to this effect, there is also nothing to be “extended” to the 
“owner” of an exclusive license so as to alter the different 
background law understood to apply to such licenses. 
c. The Summary of Recommendations 
Appendix B to the Report contains a “Summary of 
Recommendations” that recapitulates without further elaboration the 
three proposals from the section on divisibility. The wording of the 
proposals is nearly identical to that used earlier, except for that of the 
second proposal. Whereas the body of the Report proposes “[t]hat the 
statutory provisions governing ‘assignments’ extend to exclusive 
licenses,”196 the Summary abbreviates this to “[t]hat an exclusive 
license or other exclusive transfer of any particular right constitutes an 
assignment of that right.”197 This phrase in the Summary, removed 
from the context and qualifications provided in the body of the 
Report, does sound like a proposal that exclusive licenses simply be 
deemed assignments for all purposes. Read in this way, however, the 
proposal goes far beyond anything discussed or justified in the body 
                                                                                                             
 195. 1961 Report, supra note 128, at 62 (spacing added). 
 196. Id. at 92. 
 197. Id. at 94. 
2013] EXCLUSIVE LICENSE IS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT 115 
 
 
 
of the Report itself, not to mention the statutory language ultimately 
adopted. 
Far from providing “forceful” support for the claim that 
downstream transferability of exclusive licenses was expressly sought 
by the authors of the 1976 Act,198 the 1961 Report offers no 
indication that this issue had anything to do with the specific 
problems the statute was attempting to resolve or that anyone even 
expressly contemplated the implications of their proposals in this 
regard. Both the Report and the statute itself appear to assume that the 
term “exclusive licenses” is to be retained as denoting a distinct 
category of transaction. Instead of eliminating this category or 
expressly providing that any exclusive license shall be tantamount to 
an assignment for all legal purposes,199 both the Report and the statute 
take the narrower step of subjecting exclusive licenses to the same 
provisions of the copyright statute that govern assignments, thus 
conferring standing to sue and imposing formalities. The most likely 
interpretation is that either they simply were not focused on the 
Gardner issue at all, or else, they deliberately chose not to disturb the 
background law concerning restrictions on license transferability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Divisibility and transferability of ownership rights present both 
opportunities and dangers. The goal should be to facilitate a wide 
variety of transactions while guarding against the danger of excessive 
fragmentation. In a world where owners are already empowered to 
create subdivisions of the copyright and assign them outright, treating 
exclusive licenses as presumptively transferable fails to serve either 
goal. On the one hand, it reduces available transacting possibilities by 
denying licensors the ability to exercise property-based control over 
the identities of their licenseholders. On the other, it encourages the 
unfettered transfer of exclusive rights to parties far afield from those 
contemplated by the licensor, making it more likely that they will 
become difficult to track down and come into conflict with other 
plans for authorized use of the work. Congress’s use of the term 
“ownership” does not require us to embrace these consequences, nor 
should we. The Ninth Circuit got this one right. 
                                                                                                             
 198. Haemmerli, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
 199. The earlier Vestal bill had done so by providing (in the substantive 
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